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THE COMPLEXITY OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS
IS NECESSARY
STUART FoRD*

ABSTRACT

There is a widespread belief among both academics and policymakers
that internationalcriminal trials are too complex. As a result, tribunals
have come under enormous pressure to reduce the complexity of their trials. However, changes to trial procedure have not meaningfully affected
trial complexity. This Article explains why these changes have failed
and argues that the complexity of internationalcriminal trials is necessary for them to achieve their purposes.
Using a multiple regression model of thefactors driving trial complexity at the International Criminal Tribunalfor the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), this Article shows that the largest drivers of complexity are two
factors that courts cannot control: the accused's seniority within the political or military hierarchy and whether the accused is a direct perpetrator.
The complexity of internationalcriminal trials appears to be driven by
the need to attributeresponsibilityfor serious violations of international
criminal law to accused who are often both organizationally and geographically distant from the crimes with which they are charged. Attribution of responsibility is a necessary feature of most international
criminal trials, and complexity associated with this process cannot be
easily eliminated.
This Article considers various ways in which complexity could be significantly reduced-for example by making internationalcriminal law
violations strict liability offenses-but these all come with serious drawbacks that would likely undermine the purposes of internationalcriminal
justice. Ultimately, it appears that internationalcriminal trials must be
complex if they are to achieve the goals we have set for them.

*
Associate Professor of Law at the John Marshall Law School in Chicago, Illinois.
LL.M. 1998, University of Nottingham;J.D. 1998, University of Texas; B.A. 1995, University
of Houston. This Article was greatly improved by the comments of those who read earlier
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Dana, John Rappaport, Leila Nadya Sadat, Mark Berlin, and the participants in the 2014
ASIL Midwest Interest Group Workshop. Special thanks go to Keith Henwood and Walter
Dempsey for assistance with the statistics. Priyavathi Reddy provided research assistance.
Any errors that remain are mine.
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INTRODUCTION

International criminal trials are extremely complex.' The average trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) takes 176 trial days and involves more than 120
witnesses and 2,000 exhibits. 2 In comparison, the average criminal
trial in the United States takes less than one day3 and an average
murder trial takes only three or four days.4 Even the most complex
criminal trials conducted in the United States are only slightly
more complex than the average ICTY trial.5 Furthermore, two
ICTY trials have been more complex than the prosecution of
senior Nazi leaders at the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg.6
As a result, there is a widespread belief that international criminal trials are too complex7-and international tribunals have come
under enormous pressure to reduce that complexity." Courts,
including the ICTY, have often tried to achieve this by modifying
the procedural and evidentiary rules. 9 However, the changes
implemented by the ICTY failed to reduce trial complexity.' 0 This
failure is not surprising because trial complexity has not been studied quantitatively before and, until now, a good understanding of
its causes was lacking.
The principal goal of this Article is to build an empirical model
of what causes the complexity of international criminal trials. This
1.

See generally Stuart Ford, Complexity and Efficiency at InternationalCriminal Courts, 29

EMORY

INT'L L. REV. 1 (2014) [hereinafter Complexity and Efficiency] (discussing complexity

at international criminal trials and proposing a method to measure that complexity).
Complexity is a very important concept for this Article. It was discussed extensively in
Complexity and Efficiency. See id. at Section I. Key parts of that discussion are reprised
below in Section II of this Article.
2. Id. at 27 tbl.2
3. Id. at 32-33.
4. Id. at 53-54.
5. Id. at 34 (noting that one of the most complex cases ever tried in the United
States had a Complexity Score of 1.09-only slightly more complex than the average International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) trial, which had a Complexity Score of 0.97).
6. Id. at 31-32.
7. Id. at 3-4.
8. Id. at 38-41.
9. See Gillian Higgins, The Impact of the Size, Scope and Scale of the Milorevic Trial and the
Development of Rule 73bis before the ICTY, 7 Nw. J. INT'L HUM. RTs. 239, 251 (2009); Maximo
Langer & Joseph W. Doherty, Managerialjudging Goes International, But Its Promise Remains

Unfulfilled: An EmpiricalAssessment of the ICTY Reforms, 36 YALE
10.

See Langer & Doherty, supra note 9, at 267.

J. INT'L

L. 241, 242 (2011).
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will be done through the use of a multiple regression model" with
trial complexity as the response variable.1 2 Various factors that one
might expect to affect trial complexity are explanatory variables.' 3
The model allows for the estimation of the effect of the explanatory variables on trial complexity.
In theory, a better understanding of what causes trial complexity
could help us modify the process to reduce that complexity while
still maintaining fundamentally fair trials.' 4 However, the results of
the multiple regression analysis employed by this Article suggest
that it will be very difficult to meaningfully reduce the complexity
of international trials without undermining the very reasons for
having such trials. The largest drivers of complexity are two factors
that courts cannot control: the accused's seniority within the political or military hierarchy and whether the accused is a direct perpetrator.1 5 The factors that individual judges and prosecutors can
most easily influence-such as the number of crime sites, 16 the particular modes of liability,' 7 or the number of counts in the indictment-have small or nonexistent impacts on complexity.' 8
Ultimately, the complexity of international criminal trials appears
to be driven by the need to attribute responsibility for serious violations of international criminal law to accused individuals who are
11.

Multiple regression is a statistical method for estimating the effect of multiple
See GRAHAM UPTON & IAN COOK, A DicrioN-

explanatory variables on a response variable.
ARY OF STATISTICs 285-88 (3d ed. 2014).

12. In a multiple regression model, the response variable is the variable that is
hypothesized to respond to changes in the explanatory variables. See id. at 363.
13. The explanatory variables are hypothesized to explain the changes in the
response variable. Id. at 362.
14. See Stuart Ford, Fairness and Politics and Politics at the ICTY: Evidence from the Indictments, 39 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 45, 55-58 (2013) [hereinafter Fairnessand Politics]
(noting that it is important that the trials remain fundamentally fair).
15. A direct perpetrator physically commits the crimes they are charged with. For
example, the direct perpetrator of unlawful killings is the person who actually kills the
victims. Indirect perpetrators, in contrast, may be legally liable for the acts of the direct
perpetrators (for example, because they ordered the unlawful killings) but did not commit
the acts of physical violence that form the basis for the charges. See infra text accompanying notes 54-58, 80-81.
16. A crime site is a location about which the prosecution intends to present evidence
at trial. Usually it is a place where part of the crime occurred, like a mass grave site or the
location where killings took place. See infra note 63.
17. The modes of liability are "doctrines by which a person may commit, participate
in, or otherwise be found responsible for" violations of international criminal law. ROBERT
CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 361 (2d

ed. 2010). They include some modes of liability that are common in domestic settings, like
aiding and abetting, as well as some that are specific to international criminal law, including joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility. Id. at 361-62.
18. See infra Section VII(A) (discussing the results of the model).
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often both organizationally and geographically distant from the
crimes for which they are allegedly responsible.1 9 As a result of the
inherent complexity of this attribution process, it will be very difficult to meaningfully reduce trial complexity.
This Article considers six changes that could be made to reduce
trial complexity: 1) prosecute only low-level direct perpetrators and
forego prosecutions of high-level indirect perpetrators; 2) place
arbitrary limits on the time that defense and prosecution teams
have to present their cases; 3) make international criminal law a
strict liability regime; 4) switch from a representative charging system to a symbolic charging system; 20 5) switch from multi-accused
trials to single-accused trials; and 6) encourage the use of plea bargains. While the model results suggest that these changes could
reduce complexity significantly, each would involve significant
drawbacks. In most cases, the downsides appear to outweigh any
benefit that could be gained from reducing trial complexity. Ultimately, the complexity of international criminal trials appears to
be a necessary feature of the prosecution of high-level accused for
the acts of low-level perpetrators who are geographically and organizationally distant from the accused.
This Article will proceed as follows. Section II describes and
defines complexity, as the term is used in this Article. Section III
briefly describes the data that forms the basis for the analysis. Section IV develops eleven hypotheses about the causes of complexity
in international criminal trials. Section V tests those hypotheses
and describes the resulting model and its results. Section VI uses
the model to predict the complexity of the ICTY's remaining trials.
Section VII discusses the implications of the model with respect to
the six possible changes that could be made to reduce trial complexity. Section VIII concludes.
II.

COMPLEXITY

The concept of complexity is central to this Article. It is also one
that the Author has explored extensively in an earlier work titled,
19. See infra Section VII(A).
20. Symbolic charging occurs when the accused is charged with a single (or small
number) of crimes arising out of a single, significant, and easily-proven incident. In contrast, representative charging aims to charge the accused with a representative sample of
the crimes he or she is allegedly responsible for. This almost always involves charging the
accused with a larger number of counts arising out of a larger number of incidents. See
discussion infra Section VII (B) (5).
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Complexity and Efficiency at InternationalCriminal Courts.2 ' That earlier work dealt with the question of how to define trial complexity
and measure it. This Section briefly summarizes the relevant portions of that article. 22
Complexity occurs when multiple parts of a system interconnect
and interact in such a way that the whole system becomes hard to
understand or analyze.2 3 This definition is broad enough to apply
to a broad range of systems, 24 but, while it captures what a person
means when she says that a trial is complex, there is no direct
objective measure of trial complexity.2 5 Rather, trial observers and
participants perceive a trial to be complex when there are so many
moving parts that it becomes hard to keep track of them all.26 As
the number of moving parts and the interactions between them
increase, a person's ability to understand or analyze them
decreases and she perceives the trial's complexity as having
increased.2 7 Complexity exists in the mind of a trial participant or
observer. Thus, it is a subjective variable28 and it exists as a continuum rather than as a threshold between the simple and the
complex.2 9
There is broad agreement within the legal academy that there
are different types of trial complexity.3 0 The three main forms that
are relevant to international criminal trials are legal complexity,
factual complexity, and participant complexity. 3 ' Legal complexity
arises when the law is hard to ascertain (e.g., because the existing
precedents are inconsistent), technical in nature, dense (e.g., if the
law has many elements or requirements), or is simply indeterminate (e.g., when there is no precedent that governs a particular
issue).32 Factual complexity exists when the facts necessary to
decide the case are voluminous, technical, contradictory, or incom21. See generally Complexity and Efficiency, supra note 1 (discussing the concept of complexity and its importance in the context of the International Criminal Court).
22. Readers interested in the theoretical basis for the definition of complexity or the
complexity measure used in this Article should consult Complexity and Efficiency, supra note
1.
23. See id. at 12.
24. See id. at 12-13 (offering a plain language meaning of complexity that is not limited to legal systems).
25. See id. at 19.
26. See id. at 12.
27. See id. at 19.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 20.
30. See id. at 12.
31. See id. at 12-13.
32. See id. at 13.
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plete.3 3 Finally, legal decisions are made by people. Thus, the
complexity of the overall process can be affected by both the number of participants necessary to reach a decision, and the ability
and willingness of those participants to perform their roles in the
process.3 4
Scholars have noted that while the different types of complexity
are theoretically independent,3 5 the types of trials identified as the
most complex usually exhibit high levels of multiple kinds of complexity.3 6 Trials at international criminal courts are widely recognized as enormously complex, 3 7 due to their high levels of legal,
factual, and participant complexity.3 8 Until recently, however,
there had been no attempts to measure such complexity.
As noted above, trial complexity is a subjective characteristic that
cannot be measured directly. However, it can be measured with a
proxy variable.3 9 Complexity and Efficiency developed a proxy called
a Complexity Score to determine trial complexity. 40 Complexity
Scores are created as a composite of the number of trial days, trial
witnesses, and trial exhibits needed to complete a trial.4 ' This particular mix of variables was chosen as a proxy for two main reasons.
First, experts in the field usually identify these variables as indicative of complexity.4 2 Second, empirical work in the field of domestic trial complexity has identified these factors as central to
perceived complexity.4 3 This Article uses the Complexity Scores as
a proxy for the perceived complexity of trials at international criminal courts. Section V describes in more detail how Complexity
Scores are utilized.

33. See id. at 13-14.
34. See id. at 14.
35. It is possible to have factual complexity without legal complexity and vice versa.
See id. at 15.
36. See id. at 14-15.
37. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, ICTYJudicial Proceedings- An Appraisalfrom Within, 2 J.
INT'L CIuM. JusT. 466, 468 (2004) (noting that ICTY trials are "quite unlike most of the
home-grown variety" because of their complexity).
38. See Complexity and Efficiency, supra note 1, at 15-19.
39. Proxy variables are variables that can be measured directly and are used in place
of variables that cannot be measured. See UPTON & COOK, supra note 11, at 343.
40. See Complexity and Efficiency, supra note 1, at 20-24.
41. More detail on how they are calculated can be found in Complexity and Efficiency,
supra note 1, at 27.
42. See id. at 20-21.
43. See id. at 21.
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THE DATA

Unless otherwise indicated, the data for this Article come from a
database created by the Author based on trials conducted at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY).44 The database was created using information from pub-

licly available documents produced by the ICTY, including Case
Information Sheets produced by the ICTY Registry and the indictments issued by its Office of the Prosecutor. The data include
information on all trials completed through June 2013. They
exclude the results of the trials of Ratko MladiC, Radovan KaradliC,
and Goran Hadiie, which were still underway when the data were
collected.4 5 A copy of the data is available upon request.
IV.

HYPOTHESES

The principal goal of this Article is to build a model of the factors that drive the complexity of international criminal trials. The
Complexity Scores of trials at the ICTY serve as a proxy for the
complexity of those trials and are utilized as the response variable.
The explanatory variables are those that explain changes in the
response variable. In this case, the explanatory variables are based
on hypotheses about what might cause the complexity of international criminal trials. The following eleven hypotheses were developed based on the Author's experience as a litigator before both
domestic courts and international tribunals,4 6 the literature on
complexity, case law and literature about international criminal trials, and the results of empirical studies of domestic trial
complexity.
44. The ICTY was chosen largely because the majority of the information needed to
assemble the database was easily and publicly available. For example, the ICTY's Case
Information Sheets, which are made available on the ICTY's website, collect valuable information about each case, a process that would have been very difficult to duplicate for other
tribunals without carefully reading a great number of documents, including the judgments. It would be possible to create a similar database for the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) but it would be much more difficult. The International
Criminal Court (ICC), on the other hand, has not completed enough cases for a database
of their trials to be useful.
45. Further information about the database can be found in two earlier works by the
Author: Fairness and Politics at the ICTY: Evidence from the Indictments, and Complexity and
Efficiency at International Criminal Courts. See Fairness and Politics, supra note 14, at app.;
Complexity and Efficiency, supra note 1, at Section II.
46. The Author spent three years working in the Office of the Co-Prosecutors at the
ECCC as an Assistant Prosecutor. He assisted in investigating and drafting the indictments
and served on the trial team in the case of Kaing Keuk Eav alias Duch. Prior to working at
the ECCC, he spent five years litigating complex commercial matters before federal district
courts in the United States.
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Complexity increases as the number of accused
tried together increases.

There are many ways that additional defendants can add to the
complexity of trials. Where multiple accused are present, the prosecution must present evidence related to the individual guilt of
each accused, even if the defendants are accused of acting
together. This increases the complexity of the trial. If different
defendants have different trial strategies, then one would expect
them to present different witnesses and different exhibits. Even if
they have the same general trial strategy, one would still expect the
lawyers for the individual accused to want to present individualized
witnesses and exhibits and to cross-examine both the prosecution
witnesses and witnesses of the co-accused. 47 Indeed, when multiple
accused are tried together, they generally do present their own witnesses and exhibits. 4 8 Finally, for sentencing purposes, the evidence relating to aggravating and mitigating factors could be
unique to each of the accused. 4 9 For these reasons, one would
expect each additional accused tried to increase the complexity of
the trial.5 0 The presumption is supported by studies of domestic
criminal trials, which have found additional accused to result in
more complex trials.5 1

47. Cf Jenia lontcheva Turner, Defense Perspectives on Law and Politics in International
Criminal Trials, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 529, 558, 568-71 (2008) (discussing the tactics and motivations of international criminal defense lawyers).
48. See Prosecutor v. Prlit, Case No. IT-04-74, Case Information Sheet, 7 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 2013), http://icty.org/x/cases/prlic/cis/en/cisprlic al_
en.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2013) (noting the number of witnesses called and exhibits
offered by each individual defendant); Prosecutor v. Popovit, Case No. IT-05-88, Case
Information Sheet, 4 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 2010), http://icty.org/
x/cases/popovic/cis/en/cispopovic al-en.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2013) (same).
49. For example, the professional background of the accused and the accused's character are potentially aggravating factors. See Prosecutor v. Kvotka, Case No. IT-98-30/1A, Appeals Judgement, 1 678 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2005);
Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgement, 1 1114 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Sept. 1, 2004); Prosecutor v. Mucit, Case No. IT-96-21-A, AppealsJudgement, 1 788 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001). Mitigating factors
may include the accused's character and cooperation with the prosecutors and the court.
See Mucie, Case No. IT-96-21-A, 1 788; Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2A, Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, 1 66 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb.
4, 2005).
50. See David Wippman, The Cost of Internationaljustice, 100 Am. J. INr'L L. 861, 873
(2006).
51. See Michael Heise, Criminal Case Complexity: An EmpiricalPerspective, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 331, 359-60 tbl.8, 360 (2004).
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To test this hypothesis, a variable was created to record the number of accused present at trial. The variable excluded those who
were named in the indictment but were not present during trial.
H2.

Complexity increases as the seniority of the accused in the political
and military hierarchy increases.

Individuals at international criminal tribunals are often charged
as indirect perpetrators. Indirect perpetrators are alleged to be
criminally responsible for acts they did not personally commit. As
a result, evidence must be introduced that establishes their criminal responsibility for acts that they may be geographically and organizationally distant from. In these circumstances, proof of the
individual's criminal responsibility is provided through evidence
linking the accused to crimes committed by his or her subordinates
or accomplices.5 2

The presentation of such "linking evidence"5 3

can be complicated and time consuming,5 4 and tends to make trials more complex. In addition, the higher the accused's rank in a
military or political hierarchy, the more organizational levels separate them from the physical commission of the crimes, which are
usually carried out by those in the lowest levels of the hierarchy.5 5
Consequently, more linking evidence is needed to establish their
criminal responsibility. Thus, as the seniority of the accused
increases, more linking evidence is necessary and trial complexity
increases.
Senior political and military leaders may also approach their trials differently from less senior figures. For at least some senior
figures tried at the ICTY, it appeared that the defendants viewed
the trials as an opportunity to disrupt the proceedings, undermine
the legitimacy of the court, influence public opinion among their
supporters, and defend their "legacy." This was most noticeable in
the trial of Slobodan Milogevic, but was also present in other trials
52. Cf Kai Ambos, joint CriminalEnterprise and Command Responsibility, 5 J. INT'L GRIM.
159, 181 (2007) ("[I] nstead of proving a direct commission of crimes by the superior,
it suffices to prove a crime base or pattern of commission and link the superior to it.").
53. Linking evidence, also called "linkage evidence," is the term used to describe the
evidence needed to connect indirect perpetrators-who are often organizationally and
geographically distant from the crimes-to the direct perpetrators that carry out the
crimes. See Daryl A. Mundis, Book Review of The Milosevic Trial: Lessons for the Conduct of
Complex InternationalCriminal Proceedings, 102 Au. J. INT'L L. 691, 694-95 (2008).
54. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WEIGHING THE EVIDENCE: LESSONS FROM THE SLOBODAN
MILOSEVIc TsIAL 3 (Dec. 2006) ("Proving the guilt of a senior official nowhere near the
multiple crime scenes and establishing a chain of command in circumstances where no
lawful authority existed is very difficult and time-consuming.").
55. See Fairness and Politics, supra note 14, at 66-67.

JUST.

The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev.

160

[Vol. 48

of senior political and military figures.5 6 It is not surprising that
trials of this kind are more complex due to defendant's efforts to
disrupt or undermine the proceedings.
To test this hypothesis, a variable was created that ranked the
accused's seniority within the political and military hierarchy.
Seniority rankings were based upon biographical information
about each of the accused identified in the indictments, paying
particular attention to the positions and roles the accused were
alleged to have held at the time of the alleged commission of the
crimes.5 7 For multi-accused trials, the rank of the trial was the rank
of the highest-ranking individual accused.
H3.

Complexity increases as the total number of counts
in the indictment increases.

As the number of counts charged in the indictment increases,
the number of legal elements that must be proved by the prosecution also increases, presumably increasing the overall legal complexity of the trials. Increasing the number of counts also
presumably increases the factual complexity of the trials, particularly if the counts relate to separate incidents. On the other hand,
the prevalence of cumulative charging at international trials, where
the same underlying facts are charged as more than one crime,5 8
suggests that complexity will not increase linearly as the number of
counts increases. This is because there may be substantial factual
overlap between different counts. However, it still seems likely that
additional counts will result in greater complexity because charges
that relate to the same underlying set of facts must still have distinct legal elements to be charged as separate crimes.5 9 Thus, additional counts add additional legal elements that the prosecution
must prove. One would expect that the trial will require more evidence and become more complex as the number of counts alleged
against the accused increases, even when taking cumulative charg56. See Turner, supra note 47, at 573-74; Mundis, supra note 53, at 694.
57. See Fairnessand Politics, supra note 14, at 71. Cf James Meernik, Victor'sjustice or the
Law?judging and Punishingat the InternationalCriminalTribunalfor theformer Yugoslavia, 47J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 140, 151 (2003).

58. See Turner, supra note 47, at 588.
59. See Prosecutor v. Kordit, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeals judgement, 1 1033 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004) ("The Appeals Chamber will permit
multiple convictions for the same act or omission where it clearly violates multiple distinct
provisions of the Statute, where each statutory provision contains a materially distinct element not contained in the other(s), and which element requires proof of a fact which the
elements of the other statutory provision(s) do not.").

The Complexity of International Criminal Tials

2015]

161

ing into account.6 0 This presumption is evident in Rule 73 bis (E)
of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY, which
assumes that increasing the number of counts increases overall
trial complexity. 6 1 To test this hypothesis, a variable was created
that recorded the total number of counts contained in each
indictment.
H4.

Complexity increases as the number of crime sites
in the indictment increases.

Crimes or parts of crimes are usually alleged to have taken place
at specific locations, usually called crime sites. 62 Crime sites may be
locations where mass graves were found, where killings took place,
where victims were unlawfully detained, or any other location
where the prosecution intends to prove a part of the crime was
committed.6 3 For every additional crime site described in the
indictment, more evidence must be introduced at trial. Evidence
must be presented about where the crime site is, how it relates to
the other crime sites and what happened at the crime site. Thus
one would expect that, all other things being equal, the addition of
more crime sites to the indictment would result in a more complex
trial. Indeed, Rule 73 bis (D) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY presumes that the number of crime sites affects
trial complexity.6 4
To test this hypothesis, a variable was created to record the number of individual crime sites in the indictment. Each indictment
was read to identify the number of locations at which the prosecution intended to introduce evidence that a crime occurred. The
results are somewhat subjective as the indictments often use vague
language that could be interpreted differently by reasonable people; however, an attempt was made to be conservative and only
record a crime site if it was clear from the indictment that the pros60. See Defence Counsel - Pre-TrialLegal Aid Policy, INT'L CIm. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER
YuGosAvA 1[ 22 (May 1, 2006), http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Defence/pretrial_pay
ment_2006-en.doc (concluding that "the number and nature of the counts in the indictment" affects complexity).
61. See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, IT/32/Rev. 44, Dec. 10, 2009, Rule 73 bis (E) (permitting the Trial Chamber to limit the number of counts on which the Prosecutor may proceed at trial).
62. See, e.g., id. at Rule 73 bis (D) (suggesting that "crime sites" are locations "in
respect of which evidence may be presented by the Prosecutor").
63. Id.
64. See id. (permitting the Trial Chamber to "fix" the number of crime sites the Prosecutor may introduce evidence about at trial).
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ecution intended to prove at trial that part of a crime occurred
there.
H5.

Complexity increases if the accused is charged with genocide.

Genocide is the "crime of crimes," 65 and it occupies a special
place in the hierarchy of international criminal law. 6 6 It may be
that, because of the opprobrium associated with a genocide conviction, defendants will fight genocide charges more vigorously than
others, thereby increasing the complexity of the trials.6 7 Genocide
convictions also tend to result in longer sentences than convictions
for other violations of international criminal law, 68 which may
cause defendants to invest more resources in fighting genocide
charges than they would charges of commission of war crimes or
crimes against humanity. Genocide is also quite difficult to prove
because of the specific intent requirement and because genocide
trials tend to involve large amounts of circumstantial evidence.6 9
This reliance on circumstantial evidence to prove specific intent
may increase the factual complexity of the trials. For these reasons,
one might expect genocide charges to add additional complexity
to the trials. To test this hypothesis, a dummy variable7 0 was created, which indicates whether the indictment contained a charge
of genocide.
65. Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgement,
the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003).

¶

502 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for

66. See Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Judgement, 1 36 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004) ("Among the grievous crimes this Tribunal
has the duty to punish, the crime of genocide is singled out for special condemnation and
opprobrium."). But see Prosecutor v. BlaSkic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 800-02
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000) (suggesting that there is no
hierarchy amongst violations of international criminal law).
67. Some plea deals appear to have depended on the willingness of the prosecutor to
drop genocide charges, suggesting that some accused found it more palatable to plead
guilty to crimes against humanity than to plead guilty to genocide. For example, Biljana
Plavgic was willing to plead guilty to persecution on political, racial, and religious grounds
as a crime against humanity but not to genocide. See Jelena Subotic, The Cruelty of False
Remorse: Bilana Plavic at The Hague, 36 SE. EUR. 39, 42-43 (2012).
68. See Fairness and Politics, supra note 14, at 76.

&

69. See Robert Petit et al., Exploring CriticalIssues in Religious Genocide: Case Studies of
Violence in Tibet, Iraq and Gujarat, 40 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 163, 213 (2008).
70. A dummy variable is a variable that can only take the value of 0 or 1. For this
particular variable, it would take a value of 1 if there was a charge of genocide in the
indictment and a value of 0 if there was no genocide charge. The use of dummy variables
allows for the inclusion of categorical variables in multiple regression models. SeeUPTON
COOK, supra note 11, at 131.
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H6.

Complexity increases if the accused are charged as members
of a joint criminal enterprise (JCE).
Using joint criminal enterprise (JCE) as a mode of liability
requires proof that all of the members of the JCE shared a common criminal plan.7 1 Thus, it often requires evidence about the
actions and intentions of people who are not directly charged.7 2
For example, in the portion of Slobodan Milogevic's indictment
that relates to crimes allegedly committed in Croatia, the indictment alleges that Milogevic participated in a joint criminal enterprise with fifteen other named individuals. 3 The trial would thus
have to include evidence about the allegedly unlawful actions of
the other members of the JCE, even though they were not formally
before the court. One might expect this to increase the complexity
of the trial. In fact, defense attorneys have often criticized the use
of JCE for allowing the prosecutor to bring in large amounts of
evidence about the acts of individuals other than the accused.7 4
To test this hypothesis, a dummy variable was created that indicates whether joint criminal enterprise was charged as a mode of
liability in the indictment.
H7.

Complexity increases if the accused are charged under
a theory of superior responsibility.

Charging individuals using superior responsibility as the mode
of liability necessitates proof of their ability to control or command
those who committed the actual crimes.7 5 Often, this requires
detailed proof about the structure and operation of political and
military bodies.76 Thus, this evidence adds factual complexity. In
addition, this type of evidence is often provided by expert wit71. See Prosecutor v. Kvotka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Appeals Judgement, ¶ 82 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2005); Antonio Cassese, The ProperLimits of
Individual Responsibility Under the Doctrine ofJoint Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. Ir'L GRIM. JUST.
109, 110-11 (2007).
72. See Verena Haan, The Development of the Concept of Joint Criminal Enterprise at the
InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 5 Iwr'L CRIM. L. REv. 167, 182, 196
(2005).
73. See Prosecutor v. Milolevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Second Amended Indictment
Related to Croatia, ¶ 7 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 27, 2004).
74. See Turner, supra note 47, at 560-63.
75. See Prosecutor v. Kordit, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeals Judgement, ¶ 840 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004) ("The basis of the superiorsubordinate relationship is the power of the superior to control the actions of his subordinates."); Kai Ambos, supra note 52, at 161-62.
76. See Prosecutor v. Kordit, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T,Judgment, 11 419-24 ("A starting
point will be the official position held by the accused. Actual authority however will not be
determined by looking at formal positions only. Whether de jure or de facto, military or

The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev.

164

[Vol. 48

nesses, 77 who are thought to increase the overall complexity of a
trial.7 8 For these reasons, using superior responsibility as the mode
of liability may increase the complexity of the trial.
On the other hand, some defense attorneys have criticized superior responsibility on the grounds that it allegedly operates as a
form of strict liability, and that its main purpose is to reduce or
eliminate the need to prove that the accused had the mens rea necessary to have committed the underlying crime.7 9 If this were true,
superior responsibility could reduce overall trial complexity by
reducing the need for evidence related to the accused's mens rea.
To test this hypothesis, a dummy variable was created that indicates whether superior responsibility was charged as a mode of liability in the indictment.
H8.

Complexity decreases if an accused is charged as
a direct perpetratorof violence.

'

Direct perpetrators of violence are those who physically carry out
the violence charged in the indictment. They are individuals who
are accused of physically raping, torturing, or killing their alleged
victims. Indirect perpetrators may be criminally liable for the acts
of direct perpetrators, but do not physically commit violence.8 0
Trials against direct perpetrators of violence may be simpler
because they require less "linking evidence"-the evidence necessary to link individuals who are distant either geographically or
hierarchically to the crimes for which they are legally responsible. 8
In theory at least, a single eyewitness to the accused's crime might
constitute sufficient evidence for a direct perpetration conviction.
Thus, trials of direct perpetrators should be less complex than trials of indirect perpetrators.
To test this hypothesis, a dummy variable was created that indicates whether any of the accused were charged with physically committing violence against their victims.
civilian, the existence of a position of authority will have to be based upon an assessment of
the reality of the authority of the accused.").
77.

GIDEON BOAS

ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw PRACTITIONER LIBRARv: VoL

III - INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 357-58 (2011).
78. See Heise, supra note 51, at 355 (finding that perceived trial complexity increased
as the number of expert witnesses increased); id. at 360.
79. See Turner, supra note 47, at 563-65.
80. See Fairnessand Politics, supra note 14, at 64 n.85.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57.
UME
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H9. Complexity increases as the number of victims increases,
particularly the number of victims alleged to have died.
There is some evidence that the complexity of domestic trials
increases as the number of victims increases.8 2 The same is likely
true of international trials. First, some information about the victims must be proved. In the case of unlawful killings, for example,
this information usually includes that they have died, and that their
death was caused by the acts of the accused.8 3 As the number of
victims increases, the amount of evidence related to the victims will
increase, rendering the trial more factually complex. On the other
hand, detailed information about each victim is not usually proved
when there are many victims. For example, in the prosecution of
Radislav Krstic for genocide arising out of the murder of thousands
of Bosnian Muslim men at Srebrenica, the trial court did hear
some evidence from eyewitnesses about the murders.8 4 However, it
is equally clear that the court did not receive detailed information
on each victim. Rather, the number of victims was established
using experts who summarized the available information for the
court. 85 Forensic experts were permitted to testify about the number of bodies exhumed from mass graves,8 6 while a demographics
expert was allowed to testify about the number of victims based on
listings of missing persons. 7 On the basis of this summary evidence, the court was able to conclude that between seven and eight
thousand Bosnian Muslim men were executed by Serbian forces in
the days following the capture of Srebrenica.8 8 This use of summaries to establish the number and type of victims suggests that complexity will not increase linearly as the number of victims increases,
although it is still likely to increase as the number of victims
increases.
Other factors may also lead to increased complexity when there
are large numbers of victims. For example, trials that focus on
crimes with large numbers of victims may be viewed as strategically
82. See Heise, supra note 51, at 356-57 tbl.7, 359-60 tbl.8.
83. See Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement, ¶ 485 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001) (noting that murder has "consistently been
defined" as the death of the victim resulting from an act or omission of the accused committed with the intent to kill or cause serious bodily harm which he or she should reasonably have known could result in death).
84. See id. ¶ 69.
85. See id. 1 71-84 (describing the expert testimony the court heard about the
victims).
86. See id. 1 73.
87. See id. 1 81.
88. See id. ¶ 84.
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important to the prosecution. Prosecutors may, as a result, devote
additional resources to such trials. This increase in prosecutorial
resources may result in additional trial complexity. On the other
hand, this may be balanced by the desire of prosecutors to avoid
making the trial too complex.8 9
To test this hypothesis, it was necessary to construct a variable for
the number of victims alleged in the indictment. However, this was
not feasible. To use unlawful killings as an example, it is very hard
to tell from the indictments how many deaths the prosecution
intended to prove each defendant was responsible for. Many
indictments say things like "many people were killed" or "a large
number of detainees died as a result of the conditions."9 0 The difficulty was largely the result of a consistent vagueness in the indictments about the exact number of victims.9 1 It was impossible to
code this language as a specific number of people killed.9 2 As a
result, the data collected for the number of people alleged to have
been killed appears to be systematically inaccurate. 9 3
An attempt was also made to collect information on the number
of people alleged to have been deported or forcibly transferred,
and the number of people alleged to have been unlawfully imprisoned. It was even harder to code these variables than it was to code
the number of people killed. Data were missing for these two variables in the majority of cases. Ultimately, it proved impossible to
construct a reliable variable for the number of victims that could
be used to test this hypothesis.

89. See infra text accompanying note 95 (noting that skilled prosecutors tend to
decrease perceived complexity and arguing that this is a deliberate tactic).
90. Fairness and Politics, supra note 14, at 84-85 n.168.
91. This vagueness is likely due, in part, to limitations in the evidence. It is probable
that in the majority of situations the prosecutor has no clear evidence about the exact
number of people killed because the witnesses are unable to give precise figures. Unless
the killers kept meticulous records it is often quite difficult after the fact, even for those
who directly caused the deaths, to know exactly how many people died. The problem is
even worse for survivors who cannot be expected to have witnessed all the deaths or to
have kept records about what they saw. This vagueness may also be, in part, tactical. As a
prosecutor, one would rather under-promise and over-prove than the other way round.
92. The problem was exacerbated by documents filed under seal. In a number of
indictments, the exact number of dead being alleged is contained in a separate "Schedule"
attached to the indictment that is not publicly available. Fairnessand Politics, supra note 14,
at 84. Consequently, in these situations, it was not possible to assign a specific value to the
number of people allegedly killed, even though that figure is available somewhere. Id.
93. See id.
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Complexity increases as the size and quality of
the defense team increases.

There is reason to believe that one component of complexity is
participant complexity and that overall complexity increases as the
number of participants increases.9 4 Thus, as the number of lawyers
representing the parties increases, complexity should also increase.
This effect may be particularly pronounced for defense counsel
and the defense team more generally. Some studies of domestic
criminal trials have found that skilled prosecutors reduce overall
trial complexity while skilled defense counsel increase it.95
One explanation for this finding lies in the standard of proof
necessary for a conviction: proof beyond a reasonable doubt.9 6
Prosecutors have an incentive to reduce the perceived complexity
of the trial. Increasing complexity makes it harder for the decision-makers to understand and analyze the case, leading to uncertainty and doubt; too much doubt leads to acquittals. Defense
counsel, on the other hand, may try to deliberately increase trial
complexity, knowing that increased complexity could lead to
increased doubt and eventually to an acquittal. Thus, defense
counsel may have an incentive to increase overall trial complexity. 9 7 Moreover, the more accomplished the defense counsel, the
more they can increase complexity.9 8 At the same time, the more

personnel on the defense team, the more resources that can be
devoted to increasing the complexity of the trial. As a result,
increasing the size and quality of the defense team could affect
trial complexity.
This hypothesis was also not feasible to test. There was no easy
way to measure defense team quality. It might be possible to construct a proxy variable for quality by interviewing other participants
(e.g., prosecutors and defense counsel) about the quality of their
colleagues, but this was not done due to time and funding constraints. Although an attempt was made to determine defense
team size from the information available in the Case Information
Sheets, this proved unworkable. The Case Information Sheets list
94. See Complexity and Efficiency, supra note 1, at 14.
95. See Heise, supra note 51, at 355-56; Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity:
A Field Investigation of Its Meaning and Effects, 18 LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 29, 41-42 (1994).
96. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milogevic, Case No. IT-98-29/1-A, Appeals Judgement, 1 20
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 12, 2009).
97. See Heise, supra note 51, at 355; Langer and Doherty, supra note 9, at 288.
98. See supra text accompanying note 95.
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only the names of the two lead defense counsel for each accused.9 9
They do not appear to provide accurate information about the
overall size of the defense team or how defense team size varies by
accused. Given doubts about the accuracy of the data collected for
this variable, it was omitted from the model.
H11.

The personalitiesand abilities of particularparticipants affect
the complexity of the trials.

It seems likely that the personalities and abilities of individual
participants (including the judges, prosecutors, defense counsel,
and witnesses) will impact the complexity of the trial.1 00 For example, some judges may be more willing to permit extensive crossexaminations than others; other judges might be predisposed to
0
impose strict witness or time limits on the parties.o'
Some prosecutors may try to present more witnesses related to the same acts
than others would in the same situation.1 0 2 A less-skilled prosecutor might have difficulty getting the required information from the
witness in a clear and concise way without introducing uncertainty
or ambiguity into the record. A less-skilled prosecutor might also
require more time than a more-skilled one to obtain the same
information from a witness. On the defense side, a small number
of defense counsel (and defendants) attempt to disrupt the proceedings, challenge the legitimacy of the court, or make a political
statement. 0 3 However, the majority of defense counsel view their
roles as primarily to ensure that their client receives a fair trial. 0 4
These differing approaches would probably result in trials of differ99. For the vast majority of the accused in the database (82 percent), the Case Information Sheets listed exactly two counsels for the accused. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brdanin,
Case Information Sheet for Radoslav Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia 2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/cis/en/cisbrdjanin-en
.pdf (listing defense counsel as John Ackerman and David Cunningham).
100. See Complexity and Efficiency, supra note 1, at 14.
101. This might, in part, be a function of the legal systems of thejudges. Common law
judges might be more willing to permit extensive cross-examination than judges with a civil
law background, where cross-examination is rare. But it is also likely a function of the
individual personalities and abilities of thejudges. Cf Langer and Doherty, supra note 9, at
256 ("Some of our interviewees and attendees at our presentations at the ICTY suggested
[whether the judges came from common or civil law jurisdictions] as one of the factors
that might affect phase duration").
102. This may be a function of how risk-averse the individual prosecutor is. Cf Langer
& Doherty, supra note 9, at 286-87 (discussing prosecutors' risk-aversion toward acquittals
at trial).
103. See supra text accompanying note 56.
104. See Turner, supra note 47, at 566-67.
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ing complexity, even for the same set of charges.1 0 5 Finally, some
witnesses may be overwhelmed by the experience, traumatized by
recalling the past, recalcitrant, have poor memory, or be unable to
express themselves clearly.10 6 Such witnesses will increase trial
complexity due to their difficulty fulfilling their role in the process.1 0 7 In this sense, the personalities, motivations, and abilities of
individual participants almost certainly have some impact on
complexity.
This hypothesis also could not be tested. The number of trials is
too small and there are few repeat players across trials, such that
drawing useful conclusions about the impact of particular individuals on trial complexity is not workable. To isolate the effect of particular individuals, one would need a large sample and individuals
would have to be repeat players. However, international trials are
rare and take a long time to complete, and individuals rarely participate in more than a handful of trials.10 8 Thus, it may never be
practical to isolate the impact of particular individuals on trial
complexity.
V.

MODEL AND RESULTS

The summary statistics of the variables that were used in the
model are described below in Table 1. There were 41 observations
for each variable (i.e., one observation for each trial that has been
completed so far). Three trials were still underway at the time the
data was collected. 0 9 Data on those trials were not included.

105. Cf Mundis, supra note 53, at 694 (noting that some accused at the ICTY used selfrepresentation as a means to obstruct the process).
106. See, e.g., Witnesses, INT'L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YuGosLAvIA, http://www.icty
.org/sid/158 (last visited June 2, 2015) (noting that the majority of the witnesses who have
appeared before the ICTY have been victims or witnesses to horrific crimes and continue
to suffer physical and psychological trauma as a result); see also NANCY A. COMBS, FACTFINDING WITHOUT FACTS: THE UNCERTAIN EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATION OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 14-19 (2010) (describing some of the difficulties that witnesses at
international tribunals face).
107. See supra text accompanying note 34 (noting that participant complexity can be
increased by the ability and willingness of the participants to fulfill their roles in the
process).
108. See, e.g., Turner, supra note 47, at 547 (noting that due to the length of the cases,
very few of the defense counsel she interviewed for her article had represented more than
three defendants at international criminal courts).
109. See supra Section III.
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TABLE

1:

SUMMARY STATISTICS
Median

Mean

Max.

Min.

S.D.

Complexity Score

0.97

.77

0.58

.07

2.63

Total Accused

2.17

1

1.67

1

7

Seniority

5.78

6

.1.99

1

8

Total Counts

13.44

8

11.64

1

49

Number of Crime Sites

39.37

16

82.66

1

499

Genocide*

0.17

-

0.38

0

1

JCE*

0.44

-

0.50

0

1

Superior

0.80

0.40

0

1

0.48

0

1

Responsibility*
Direct Perpetrator*

0.34

-

* represents a dummy variable; medians not reported for dummy variables

The hypotheses described above in Section IV were tested using
a multiple regression model. There are many different methods
available for statistical analysis, and choosing an appropriate
method is important. 1 10 The key factors in choosing a method are
the number and type of the response variables, and the number
and type of the explanatory variables.' 1 1 The data used in this Article have a single response variable (the Complexity Score) and it is
an interval variable." 2 There are multiple explanatory variables,
some of which are interval variables, and some of which are categorical variables.11 3 Multiple regression was chosen to analyze the
data because it best fits the number and type of the response and
explanatory variables.11 4
110. See What StatisticalAnalysis Should I Use?, INST. FOR DIGITAL REs. & EDUC., http://
www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult.pkg/whatstat/ (last visited May 15, 2015) (listing a number of
different methods and when they are appropriate).
111. See id.
112. An interval variable is one where the values of the variable have a clear ordering
and the intervals between the values of the variables are equally spaced. See What is the
Difference Between Categorical, Ordinaland Interval Variables?, INST. FOR DIGITAL RES. & EDUC.,
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult pkg/whatstat/nominalordinalinterval.htm (last visited May 7, 2015).
113. A categorical variable is one that has two or more categories, but there is no
intrinsic ordering to the categories. Id. The dummy variables for genocide, direct perpetration, JCE, and superior responsibility are categorical variables. The variables for number of accused, number of counts, seniority, and number of crime sites are interval
variables.
114. See What Statistical Analysis Should I Use, supra note 110 (noting that multiple
regression is appropriate where there is a single interval response variable and one or
more interval explanatory variables as well as one or more categorical explanatory
variables).
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Once multiple regression was chosen as the method, an additional criterion had to be met. To be able to use multiple regression, the response variable should be normal. 15 The response
variable (trial complexity) was tested using a Shapiro-Wilk test for
normality,1 1 6 but it was not normal.1 17 As a result, the complexity
variable was transformed. Transformations occur when a variable
is subjected to a mathematical function. The goal is to transform
the variable so that it meets the assumptions of the model.1 1 8 A
number of transformations were tried, but the square root was
used because the square root of the complexity variable appears to
be normal.1 1 9 As a result, the multiple regression model uses the
square root of the Complexity Scores as the response variable. The
explanatory variables are those described above in the section on
hypotheses.
The results of the model1 20 are shown below in Table 2. The
model as a whole is statistically significant (p < .0001)121 and the
residuals appear to be randomly distributed when plotted. Moreover, the adjusted R2 value is .59, demonstrating that the model
explains approximately sixty percent of the variation in the com115. For a technical definition of a normal variable, see UPTON & COOK, supra note 11,
at 301. Less technically, a graph of the values of a normal variable will produce a bell
curve. Id. at 35. Multiple regression depends on the assumption that the response variable
is normal. See What StatisticalAnalysis Should I Use?, supra note 110.
116. A Shapiro-Wilk test checks whether the sample has a specified distribution. See
UPTON & COOK, supra note 11, at 389. It is most often used to test whether a variable has a
normal distribution.
117. To be more precise, the test rejected the null hypothesis (that complexity was
normal) with a high degree of significance (p < .005).
118.

See UPTON & COOK, supra note 11, at 427.

119. Again, to be more precise, a Shapiro-Wilk test of the square root of the complexity
variable was unable to reject the null hypothesis (that the transformed variable was normal) with p = .47.
120. This model, which uses multiple regression to regress the explanatory variables
against the square root of the Complexity Scores, is also sometimes referred to in this
Article as the principal regression, to distinguish it from alternative versions of the model
that were tried as a means to test the robustness of the principal regression. See infra text
accompanying note 141 (describing some of the alternative versions that were tested).
121. In statistics, the p-value represents the likelihood that the results could have been
See MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN, BASIC CONCEPTS OF PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS IN THE LAW 53-54 (Springer 2009); UPTON & COOK, supra note 11, at 195-97. The
achieved by chance.

smaller the p-value, the less likely the results occurred by chance. Id. When the p-value is
lower than a certain limit, the result is said to be statistically significant. Id. For this Article, a hypothesis test is significant when p < .05. Id. When the p-value is less than .05 the
null hypothesis is rejected and the variable is significant. Id. In terms of the principal
regression as a whole, the null hypothesis is that the model has no explanatory power.
That hypothesis can be rejected because the p-value is less than .05.
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plexity scores. 122 This is a strong result.' 2 3 Thus, the model meets
the assumptions necessary for multiple regression analysis, it is
highly significant, the errors appear to be randomly distributed,
and it explains the majority of the differences in trial complexity
across different trials. This makes it a useful model for trying to
understand the causes of trial complexity at the ICTY. 2 4
TABLE

2:

PRINCIPAL

REGRESSION
Regression Coefficient
0.077***

Total Accused

Seniority

0.065**

Total Counts

0.0061*

Crime Sites
Genocide
JCE
Sup. Resp.

0.00060
0.066
0.048
-0.088

Direct Perpetrator

-0.20*

Constant

0.40**

Observations

Adjusted 1e
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *

41

0.59
p < 0.001

The model's results are consistent with some but not all of the
tested hypotheses. The variable with the highest level of significance (p<.001) was that complexity of the trial increases as the
number of accused tried together increases. The next most significant variable was that seniority of the accused affects trial complexity (p<.01). As the seniority of the accused increased, the
complexity of the resulting trial also increased. The effect size1 25
122.

See infra Table 2 (noting that the adjusted R2 is .59).

123.

See AIAN C. ACOCK, A GENTLE INTRODUCTION TO STATA 252 (3d ed. 2012) (noting

that an R2 value greater than .3 is usually considered a strong result).
124. See infra text accompanying notes 151-152 (noting that models cannot perfectly
represent reality and that the key criterion is whether the model is useful).
125. The effect size measures the size of the effect the explanatory variable has on the
response variable. In the principal regression, the effect size is represented by the absolute
value of the regression coefficient. The larger the absolute value of the regression coefficient, the larger the effect that explanatory variable has on trial complexity. The direction
of the effect is shown by whether the regression coefficient is positive or negative. Positive
regression coefficients indicate variables that increase complexity, while negative regression coefficients indicate variables that decrease complexity. SeeJEFFERY T. WALKER & SEAN
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was roughly equivalent to the effect size of the trial accused variable, suggesting that increasing the seniority of the accused by one
levell 2 6 is roughly equivalent to adding another accused to the trial.
Two other variables met the test of statistical significance (i.e.,
p<.05). Charging an accused as a direct perpetrator of violence
resulted in a less complex trial as predicted. This variable had by
far the largest effect size. Its effect was roughly equivalent to reducing the number of accused on trial by three or decreasing the
seniority of the accused by three levels.
Finally, the total number of counts in the indictment also seems
to predict trial complexity, with more counts leading to more complex trials. However, the effect size is small.1 2 7 It is approximately
an order of magnitude smaller than the effect size for either number of trial accused or seniority of the accused.12 8 This suggests
that while the number of counts matters as a factor in trial complexity, it matters a lot less than the number of accused or their
seniority. For example, the median number of counts in an ICTY
trial was 8.129 Doubling the number of counts in the median trial
would add less complexity than increasing the seniority of the
accused by one level or adding one additional accused to the trial.
Four hypotheses failed the test of significance.1 3 0 First, the number of crime sites identified in the indictment did not have any
demonstrable effect on trial complexity when the other explanatory variables were taken into account.' 3' Moreover, the effect size
MADDAN,

STATISTICS IN CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

404-05 (4th ed., 2013).
126. The levels of seniority correspond roughly to organizational levels within the
appropriate hierarchy. For example, individuals with political positions were coded as
working at the individual, town, municipal, regional, national or international level. An
increase in seniority of one level corresponds with moving, for example, from the leadership of a municipality to the leadership of a region. For military positions, the levels were
soldier, squad, platoon, company, battalion, brigade, corps, or command staff. An increase
in seniority of one level corresponds with moving, for example, from the leadership of a
company to leadership of a battalion.
127. See supra Table 2.
128. See id.
129. See supra Table 1.
130. Technically, this failure means that the model was unable to reject the null
hypothesis that the explanatory variable had no effect on the response variable. See UPTON
& COOK, supra note 11, at 195 ("If the actual value of the statistic is close to its expected
value the test is deemed to be not significant and the decision is not to reject [the null
hypothesis]."). Consequently, one cannot be sure these variables have any effect on trial
complexity. It is possible that they do have some effect, but the effect is so small that the
model cannot detect it.
131. See supra Table 2.
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was roughly a hundred times smaller than the effect of the number
of trial accused or the accused's seniority. 3 2
Similarly, there was no statistically significant effect on trial complexity from using JCE or superior responsibility as a mode of liability. The regression coefficient for superior responsibility is
negative, 3 3 which may mean that using superior responsibility as a
mode of liability decreases complexity.' 3 4 However, given that the
result is not significant, it would be unwise to read too much into
this finding.
Finally, the genocide variable was not significant. This suggests
that even though genocide is sometimes referred to as the "crime
of crimes,"135 trials that involve genocide charges are no more com-

plex on average than trials of war crimes or crimes against humanity.1 3 6 These negative results are somewhat surprising, given the
theoretical reasons for believing that particular modes of liability
or charges could increase trial complexity.1 3 7
In conclusion, the principal regression demonstrates that the
strongest predictors of trial complexity are the number of accused,
the seniority of the accused, and whether or not the accused are
charged as direct perpetrators. Each of these factors is significant
and the magnitude of the regression coefficients means they have a
meaningful effect on trial complexity. 3 8 The total number of
counts is also significant; however, its relatively small effect size
means that it is less likely to meaningfully affect trial complexity.1 3 9
Finally, the four remaining variables-number of crime sites, use
ofJCE, use of superior responsibility, and charging genocide-cannot be shown to have any statistically significant effect on trial
complexity. 140
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See supra text accompanying note 79 (noting that some defense counsel contend
that using superior responsibility as a mode of liability decreases trial complexity by simplifying proof of the accused's mens rea).
135. See Petit et al., supra note 69, at 213.
136. See supra Table 2.
137. See supra Section IV, Hypotheses 5-7 (explaining the reasons to expect that these
factors would have some effect on trial complexity).
138. See supra Table 2.
139. See, for example, Figure 1 infra, which shows the relative effect of the various
explanatory variables on the median ICTY trial. Seniority and direct perpetration have
much larger effects on the complexity of the median ICTY trial than any of the other
explanatory variables.
140. See supra Table 2.
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The robustness of the principal regression was checked using
alternative models.14 1 The results were remarkably consistent. The
number of trial accused and the seniority of the accused were significant in all of the alternative models.14 2 Direct perpetration was
significant in all but one of the alternative models,1 4 3 while the
total number of counts was significant in a little over half of the
alternative models.1 4 4
Moreover, the effect size of the variables was also consistent
across the various models.1 4 5 The regression coefficient for direct
perpetration was always negative and approximately twice as large
as the regression coefficients for seniority and number of
accused.1 4 6 The regression coefficient for total number of counts
was always positive and approximately an order of magnitude
smaller than the regression coefficients for seniority and number
of accused.1 4 7

Thus, it appears that the results with respect to number of
accused and seniority of the accused are robust, and do not
depend on the particular model used. The finding that direct perpetration is significant is also quite robust. It was significant in all
but one of the alternative models.1 48 The least robust finding is
that the number of counts is significant.1 4 9 It is significant in the
main regression, although barely so, but is not significant in a number of alternative models. This suggests that the finding with
regard to the number of counts is partly dependent on the particular specifications of the model.
There are limitations to the model used in the principal regression, just as there are limitations with any statistical model. It
50 It is
proved impossible to test three of the eleven hypotheses.o
141. A number of alternative models were tried, including: 1) a robust regression of
the untransformed Complexity Scores; 2) a backwards stepwise regression of the transformed Complexity Scores; 3) a principal component analysis of the components of the
Complexity Scores followed by a regression of the principal component; and 5) a regression of the number of trial days. None of the alternative models was markedly better than
the principal regression at explaining the variance in trial complexity. See STUART FoRD,
OUTPUT OF THE Do FILE (2015) (unpublished document) (on file with author) (containing
the output obtained from running all of the alternative models on the ICTY database).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 82-108.
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also likely that there are other factors that affect trial complexity
that were not tested. In this sense, the model is incomplete.' 5
Even though it is not perfect, the model is still useful 15 2 because it
improves our understanding of the factors driving the complexity
of international criminal trials.
VI.

PREDICTING TRIAL COMPLEXITY

The ability to predict trial complexity before trial would be
highly useful, as international criminal tribunals have been unable
to accurately predict how long their trials will take. For example,
the ICTY has consistently underestimated the length and complexity of its trials resulting in a constantly shifting target for ending its
work.15 3 It has blamed its inability to predict the length of its trials
on their complexity.1 54
If the ICTY had been better able to predict the length and complexity of its trials it could have: 1) made better estimates about the
date on which all of the trials would be completed; 15 5 2) made better estimates about the overall cost of the trials1 5 6; 3) allowed
judges to make more informed decisions about how much time to
allow the parties for the presentation of their cases' 5 7 ; 4) helped
Registry officials manage legal aid costs 15 8 ; 5) permitted the Regis-

try, prosecutors and defense counsel to make more accurate decisions about staffing requirements 1 5 9; and 6) helped states make
informed decisions about the utility of international criminal tri151. See George E.P. Box, Science and Statistics, 71 J. AM. STAT. Ass'N 791, 792 (1976)
("Since all models are wrong the scientist cannot obtain a 'correct' one by excessive
elaboration.").
152.
See GEORGE E.P. Box, EMPIRICAL MODEL BUILDING AND RESPONSE SURFACEs 424
(1987) ("Essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful.").
153. Complexity and Efficiency, supra note 1, at 16.
154. Id. at 17.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 153-54 (noting that the ICTY has been unable
to accurately predict the length of its trials).
156. The cost of the ICTYs work has been driven, to a large extent, by the complexity
of its trials. Because the ICTY has been unable to accurately predict the length of its trials,
it has also been unable to accurately predict the total cost of those trials. Better predictions about trial complexity would ultimately lead to more accurate budgeting over the
long-term.

157. Cf Langer & Doherty, supra note 9, at 283 (noting that judges at international
tribunals are at a disadvantage in managing the trials because they have significantly less
information about the case than the parties). See also id. at 285 n.118 (same).
158. See Defence Counsel - Pre-TrialLegal Aid Policy, supra note 60, 1 22 (noting that legal
aid costs are tied to the expected complexity of the cases).
159. It has often been difficult to know how many judges, prosecutors, translators, and
other support staff a court will need at any given time because international criminal
courts have consistently under-estimated the amount of time necessary to conduct their
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als.16 0 In short, being able to predict the complexity of the ICTY's
cases would have had significant benefits.
The principal regression can be used to predict the majority of
the complexity of the ICTY's trials. It produces the following equation for the complexity of ICTY trials:
2

Complexity = .077(A) + .065(S) + .0061(C) + .00060(CS)
+ .066(G) + .048(J) - .088(R) - .20(D) + .40 + E

Complexity = (.077(A) + .065(S) + .0061(C) + .00060(CS)
.066(G) + .048() - .088(R) - .20(D) + .40
+ E)2

+

Complexity is the expected Complexity Score for the trial; A is
the number of accused on trial; S is the seniority of the accused; C
is the total number of counts alleged in the indictment; CS is the
number of crime sites in the indictment. G is 1 if a genocide
charge is included in the indictment and 0 if it is not. J is 1 if the
accused are charged as members of aJCE and 0 if it is not. R is 1 if
superior responsibility is used as a mode of liability and 0 if it is
not. D is 1 if the accused are alleged to have physically committed
violence against the victims and 0 if they are not. Finally, E is an
error term. Solving for complexity, the result is:

With this equation one can make predictions about how long
individual trials will take.
Some of the most important trials at the ICTY are currently
underway. The last three accused on trial are Ratko Mladi , Goran
Hadi6, and Radovan Karadii6. Mladi6 is the former commander
of the Bosnian Serb Army and is charged with genocide arising out
of the killing of thousands of Bosnian Muslim men and boys at
Srebrenica. 16 1 Radovan Karadli is the former president of the
trials. See, e.g., Dominic Raab, Evaluatingthe ICTY and its Completion Strategy, 3J. INT'L CIuM.
86 (2002).
160. States presumably fund international trials because they believe the goals that
such courts achieve justify the expense. But because courts (and by extension the states
that pay for them) have been unable to make accurate predictions about the overall length
or cost of their trials, states have not been able to make accurate calculations in advance
about how much money they are committing to spend by funding a court. Better upfront
predictions about length and cost could lead to better decision-making by states about
whether to support such courts.
161. See Prosecutor v. Mladit, Case Information Sheet for Ratko Mladie, Case No. IT09-92 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 2011), http://icty.org/x/cases/mladic/
cis/en/cismladic-en.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2012).
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Republika Srpska and is also charged with genocide in connection
with the massacre at Srebrenica. 162 Goran Hadie is the former
president of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) and is charged
with various crimes against humanity and war crimes arising out of
the treatment of non-Serbs within the territory of the RSK1 6 3
These are all important cases that involve some of the most senior
surviving members of the Serb political and military leadership.
They are all also cases that one would, intuitively, expect to be complex. But how complex will they be?
Using the equation above, one can predict the complexity of the
ICTY's remaining trials. The result appears below in Table 3, and
indicates that the trials of Mladi6, Hadi, and Karadlie will indeed
be complex. Each trial is predicted to have a Complexity Score
greater than one, which means each will be more complex than
the average ICTY case,16 4 despite each being a single-accused case.
Their above average complexity appears to be a result of the
seniority of the accused and the fact that all of them are charged as
indirect perpetrators.
TABLE

3: EST.

COMPLEXITY OF REMAINING TIUALS

Radovan Karadfi
Goran Hadli
Ratko Mladit

1.22
1.12
1.08

Predicting the complexity of the remaining ICTY trials can also
serve as a check on the validity of the model. By definition, the
model can predict the complexity of the trials that were used to
create the model. After all, we know the model is the best possible
fit of the data used to create it. Making accurate predictions about
trials that were not included in the database would show that trial
complexity can be predicted in advance.1 65 After these three trials
have ended, it will be possible to calculate their actual complexity.
162. See Prosecutor v. Karadit, Case Information Sheet for Radovan Karadlit, Case
No. IT-95-5/18 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 2014), http://icty.org/x/
cases/karadzic/cis/en/ciskaradzicen.pdf (last visited July 10, 2015).
163. See Prosecutor v. Hadi, Case Information Sheet for Goran Hadlit, Case No. IT04-75 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia), http://icty.org/x/cases/hadzic/cis/
en/cishadzicen.pdf (last visited July 10, 2015).
164. The average ICTY trial had a Complexity Score of .97. See Complexity and Efficiency,
supra note 1, at 28.
165. See UrrON & COOK, supra note 11, at 105 (noting that a model is more likely to be
valid if it shows predictive accuracy on out of sample data).
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This value can then be compared to their predicted complexity in
Table 3 to assess the validity of the model.
VII.
A.

DISCUSSION

The Difficulty of Attributing Responsibility

This Article began with the premise that understanding the drivers of trial complexity at international courts could help courts and
trial participants decide how to reduce trial complexity. The
model results do not offer a lot of hope for easy fixes. The results
suggest that complexity is driven primarily by factors that individual judges and prosecutors have little control over: the accused's
seniority and whether the accused is a direct perpetrator.1 66
In contrast, the results suggest that factors which judges and
prosecutors have control over have negligible associations with trial
complexity.1 6 7 For example, adding or removing crime sites
appears to have no effect on complexity. 6 8 Similarly, trial complexity does not appear to be driven by the legal qualification of
the charges or the mode of liability alleged. Genocide trials were
no more complex on average than trials involving other sorts of
charges.1 69 Neither the use of joint criminal enterprise (JCE) nor
superior responsibility as modes of liability resulted in a statistically
significant increase or decrease in trial complexity.1 70 The total
number of counts in the indictment was significant in the principal
regression, but only barely so. 1 7 1 More importantly, the effect size

was more than an order of magnitude lower than the effect size of
the other three significant factors.1 72
There is one factor, however, that prosecutors and judges do
control that significantly affects trial complexity: the number of
accused tried together. The more accused tried together, the
more complex the resulting trial.1 73 This raises the possibility that
complexity could be reduced by trying accused separately. But separating accused into individual trials would not reduce complexity
for the system as a whole. It would replace one trial with multiple
accused with multiple trials each with a single accused. This could
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See infra text accompanying notes 178-94.
See infra text accompanying notes 168-77.
See infra Table 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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reduce the complexity of the individual trials. However, it would
significantly increase the total complexity of the group of trials in
comparison to a single trial with multiple accused. 7 4
In other words, the factors that individual prosecutors and
judges are able to control are not factors that generate the majority
of trial complexity. Prosecutors choose how many crime sites to
include in the indictment. They choose the number of counts and
the legal qualification of those counts in the indictment. They
decide what modes of liability to use. At the ICTY, judges have
some control over these factors as well.' 75 For example, they can
limit the number of crime sites and limit the number of counts.176
But these are not the factors that cause the majority of trial
complexity.1 77
FIGURE

1:

MAGNITUDE OF COMPONENTS OF COMPLEXITY
IN MEDIAN

ICTY CASE

0.5

0.4

0.3

ter

0.2

0.1
0
No. of Seniority Total
Counts
Accused

Crime Genocide
Sites

JCE

Sup.
Resp.

Direct
Perp.

Figure 1 demonstrates the magnitude of the factors that affect
the Complexity Score in the median ICTY trial. It shows the components of trial complexity in a case that has one accused with a
seniority value of six where the indictment contains eight separate
174. See infra Section VII(B) (4) (using the model to predict the net effect of switching
from multi-accused trials to single-accused trials and finding that multi-accused trials are
less complex).
175. See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, IT/32/Rev. 44, Dec. 10, 2009, Rule 73 bis (noting that the judge may direct
the prosecutor to limit the number of crime sites and counts which will be included in the
trial).
176. Id.
177. See supra Table 2.
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counts that relate to sixteen different crime sites.17 8 The absolute
value of the effect size of the four dummy variables is also shown
on the chart for comparison purposes. This shows the magnitude
of the effect of the various factors that contribute to trial complexity in the median ICTY trial.
The explanatory variable that by far has the largest impact on
trial complexity is seniority. The effect of seniority is eight times as
large as the effect of the number of counts and forty times larger
than the effect of the number of crime sites.17 9 After seniority, the
factor that has the most impact in trial complexity is whether the
accused is a direct perpetrator.1 8 0 It has more than twice the effect
of any of the other dummy variables.' 8 ' Collectively, seniority and
direct perpetration account for the majority of trial complexity in
the median case.'8 2 By comparison, the number of counts and the
number of crime sites in the indictment represent only a small fraction of the resulting trial complexity. 1 3
This helps to explain the results of Professors Mdximo Langer
and Joseph W. Doherty's study of efforts to reform the ICTY's
Rules of Procedure and Evidence to reduce the length and cost of
the trials. Professors Langer and Doherty found that the reforms
did not reduce the length of the trials.1 84 This result is unsurprising in light of the principal regression.18 5 The ICTY reforms
focused on giving the judges more control over factors like the
number of crime sites and counts in the indictment, but these factors do not create the majority of trial complexity.1 86
The model results suggest that the causes of complexity cannot
be easily addressed without major changes to international criminal law. To begin with, the complexity of the trials increases as the
accused's seniority in their respective military or political hierarchy
increases.' 8 7 More importantly, this increase occurs independently
of the number of crime sites in the indictment, the number of
counts in the indictment, the mode of liability used, and the legal
178. This represents the median ICTY trial. The data on a median trial comes from
Table 1. The values in Figure 1 were calculated using the equation from Section VI.
179. See supra Figure 1.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See Langer and Doherty, supra note 9, at 267.
185. See supra Table 2 (presenting the results of the principal regression).
186. See supra Figure 1.
187. See supra Table 2.
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qualification of the charges."' The increase in trial complexity
appears to arise from the accused's position within the political or
military hierarchy at the time of the commission of the alleged
crimes. Moreover, the increase in complexity is substantial. Every
increase in one level in the accused's seniority is almost equivalent
to adding an additional accused to the trial. 189
This suggests that the main cause of complexity in international
criminal trials is the difficulty of attributing responsibility for
crimes to senior accused rather than the need to prove that those
crimes were committed. In effect, the number of crime sites functions as a proxy for the amount of evidence needed to prove the
physical acts of violence. 19 0 Each crime site is a location at which
some act of violence occurred.1 9 ' The larger the number of crime
sites, the more evidence will be needed to prove the physical violence. But increasing the number of crime sites does not meaningfully increase complexity,1 9 2 suggesting that it is not the evidence
necessary to prove that the crimes were committed that causes the
bulk of trial complexity. Rather, it is the difficulty of demonstrating the accused's criminal responsibility for crimes that the
accused is geographically and organizationally distant from that
results in complexity.
This conclusion is corroborated by the effect of direct perpetration on trial complexity. When an accused is a direct perpetrator
of the crimes (i.e., they inflicted the violence themselves rather
than through subordinates or accomplices), trials are significantly
less complex, even considering all other factors, including the
accused's seniority.19 3 The main difference between trying someone as the direct perpetrator of a crime and as an indirect perpetrator of that same crime is whether linking evidence is necessary
to attribute criminal responsibility for the violence to the
accused. 194 In other words, the fact that direct perpetrators have
much shorter trials, independent of the other factors, indicates
that it is the absence of linking evidence that makes their trials
shorter.
If complexity is driven largely by the need to attribute responsibility for crimes to senior accused, then there may not be any sim188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.
Id.
See
See
See
See
See

supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
supra text accompanying note 62.
supra Table 2.
supra Table 2.
supra text accompanying notes 80-81.

2015]

The Complexity of International Criminal Trials

183

ple way to reduce the complexity of international criminal trials.
After all, indirect perpetration is a hallmark of international trials. 195 Unlike the vast majority of domestic criminal prosecutions,
where the accused is alleged to have acted alone,1 9 6 international
crimes (at least the sort that are prosecuted at international tribunals) tend to be carried out by hierarchically organized groups,
often military units or paramilitary groups. 19 7 Moreover, the physical violence tends to be carried out by those lowest in the hierarchy, while being orchestrated by those much higher up.' 9 8 The
result is that those responsible for orchestrating the crimes are usually geographically and organizationally distant from the violence
committed by their subordinates.19 9 This makes it much more difficult to attribute criminal responsibility to them. Furthermore,
the more levels of the hierarchy separating the accused from the
direct perpetrators, the more difficult it will be to establish the
accused's criminal responsibility.
This explanation is consistent with the model results. 200 If the
explanation is accurate, then courts will have difficulty reducing
the complexity of their trials; they cannot directly control the
accused's position in the hierarchy or whether the accused is a
direct perpetrator in the same way that they can control the number of crime sites or the number of counts in the indictment. They
can choose whether to try a particular individual, but once a decision to try that person has been taken, much of the resulting trial
complexity is locked in by factors the court cannot control. Having
said that, there may be some things courts can do to reduce complexity. The following Section will explore six options.
195. See CRYER ET AL., supra note 17, at 361 ("Unlike in domestic law, where the traditional image of a criminal is the primary perpetrator such as the person who pulls the
trigger, in international criminal law, the paradigmatic offender is often the person who
orders, masterminds, or takes part in a plan at a high level.").
196. See Fairnessand Politics, supra note 14, at 67-68.
197. See id. at 67.
198. See id.
199.
See ICC OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, STRATEGIC PLAN JUNE 2012-2015 1 19 (Oct.
11, 2013) [hereinafter STRATEGIC PLAN] (noting that one of the challenges the ICC faces is
that the crimes involve "complex structures with the [individuals] most responsible often
keeping a distance between themselves and the crimes, using different mechanisms to conceal their role.").
200. An alternative explanation could be that there is something unusual about senior
leaders that causes their trials to be more complex. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note
56 (suggesting that senior leaders see their trials largely in political terms and this viewpoint causes them to act in ways that increase the complexity of those trials). It is more

likely that complexity is a result of both the difficulty of attributing responsibility and the
political goals of senior leaders. Ultimately, this has little effect on this Article's findings
because the court cannot easily control either factor.
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Methods for Reducing Trial Complexity

There are at least six ways that the overall complexity of trials at
international criminal tribunals could be reduced, which are
explored in the Section below. The ICTY has already tried incremental changes to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, but those
failed to reduce trial complexity.20 1 The proposals below all
involve more radical changes to the process, but all of them also
carry very serious drawbacks. Ultimately, it may not be possible to
dramatically reduce trial complexity without undermining the purposes of the trials.
1.

Changes to the Rules of Procedure

The most obvious solution, and the one already tried by the
ICTY, is to modify its Rules of Procedure. 20 2 However, Professors
Langer and Doherty's study found that the ICTY's attempts to
reduce trial complexity by modifying the rules have not worked. 203
This does not mean that no changes to the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence could be effective at reducing complexity. One can imagine a hypothetical rule that arbitrarily limited each side to twenty
trial days and twenty trial witnesses to present their case. This
would be a radical change to the rules, and it would undoubtedly
reduce trial complexity. However, it would also undermine the
fairness of the proceedings. The crimes tried at international criminal tribunals are factually and legally complex. They tend to
involve violence that occurred over broad geographic areas and
over months or years of time. 204 They also involve large numbers
of victims. 20 5 In addition, they involve hierarchically organized
groups acting together and the attendant need for linking evidence. 206 It would simply not be possible to try them fairly in arbitrarily short periods.
Arbitrarily short trials would be extremely problematic because it
is crucial to a tribunal's success that the process remains fundamentally fair. 207 The changes that have been made to the ICTY's
Rules of Procedure and Evidence to reduce complexity have
already raised some fairly serious questions about their effect on
201.
202.
203.

See supra text accompanying note 184.
See supra text accompanying note 9.
See supra text accompanying note 10.

204.

See Fairnessand Politics, supra note 14, at 86-87.

205.
206.
207.

See id. at 84-85.
See id.
See id. at 55-59.
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the fairness of the proceedings. 208 It may not be possible to make
further changes in favor of expediency without undermining the
overall fairness of trials. 209 There are limits to the kind of changes
one can make to procedural rules to reduce complexity, and the
ICTY is already close to those limits.
2.

Changes to International Criminal Law

Another way to reduce the complexity of international criminal
trials would be to change the substance of international criminal
law rather than the procedural rules. This might be done by making violations of international criminal law strict liability crimes.
For example, one might make senior political and military leaders
strictly liable for the criminal acts of agents of the state or organization when those acts constitute violations of international criminal
law. This would greatly simplify the attribution of crimes. It would
be sufficient to show that the crimes occurred, were caused by
agents of the state or organization, and that the accused occupied
a position of authority within the state or organization at the time
they occurred. There would be no need to present evidence relating to the mens rea of the accused. 210 Such trials would be less complex than current trials because it would be much simpler to
attribute criminal responsibility to senior accused.
However, switching to strict liability would be a bad idea because
it would remove the requirement of culpability as a prerequisite to
conviction.2 1 1 Strict liability crimes are disfavored in domestic
criminal justice systems.2 12 Relatively few domestic crimes are strict
liability crimes; those that tend to have small penalties and are not
associated with strong moral condemnation.2 1 3 The typical example of a strict liability offence in domestic law is speeding. 2 14 Strict
208. See Complexity and Efficiency, supra note 1, at sec. IV(A).
209. See id.
210. SeeJOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw 145 (6th ed., 2012) (noting
that a strict liability crime is one that does not contain a mens rea requirement as to one or
more of the elements of the crime).
211. See infra text accompanying notes 212-18.
212. DRESSLER, supra note 210, at 145
213. See DRESSLER, supra note 210, at 145-46; Allison Marston Danner &Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations:Joint CriminalEnterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of
InternationalCriminalLaw, 93 CAL. L. REv. 75, 147 (2005) ("Strict liability, where the defendant need have no particularly blameworthy mental state, is rare and disfavored in criminal
law; it most often appears in regulatory offenses for which no particular moral stigma
attaches.").
214. SeeJohn Shepard WileyJr., Not Guilty By Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal
CriminalInterpretation,85 VA. L. REV. 1021, 1024 (1999) ("One argument for the efficiency
of strict liability, however, may have some force in petty cases when the stakes are low:

186

The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev.

[Vol. 48

liability crimes are disfavored because when an individual is convicted of a crime, society is condemning that person as a wrongdoer and punishing them. 2 1 5 It is simply not fair to condemn and
punish a person who has not committed any act that can be considered morally blameworthy. 216 For this reason, strict liability has
generally been viewed unfavorably when applied to crimes that
entail severe punishment or moral condemnation. 2 1 7 International criminal law is not an appropriate place for strict liability
precisely because of the severe penalties and moral condemnation
that accompany violations of international criminal law.2 1 8

Indeed, even the closest thing to strict liability in international
criminal law-superior responsibility-is not really strict liability.2 1 9

It still requires that the prosecution show that the superior had
effective control over the direct perpetrators, that the superior
failed to exercise proper control over the perpetrators, and that
the accused knew or should have known that the perpetrators were
traffic citations and the like, where a defendant faces neither the threat of prison nor the
stain of a felony conviction."). The exception to this general rule in the United States is
statutory rape, which is often treated as a strict liability crime despite carrying a severe
penalty. See DRESSLER, supra note 210, at 147.
215. See DRESSLER, supra note 210, at 120-21.
216. See id. See also Gerhard Werle & Florian Jessberger, Unless OtherwiseProvided: Article
30 of the ICC Statute and the Mental Elements of Crimes Under InternationalCriminal Law, 3 J.
INT'L CRIM. JusT. 35, 36 (2005) ("The idea that criminal liability should be imposed only
on persons who are sufficiently aware of what they are doing and of the consequences that
their actions may have is generally recognized in domestic and international criminal justice systems."); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 137 (2003)

("[A] person

may only be held criminally liable if he is somehow culpable for any breach of criminal
rules.").
217. See DRESSLER, supra note 210, at 148 ("Most modern criminal law scholars look
unkindly upon the abandonment of the mens rea requirement."); Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARv. L. REv. 828, 831 (1999) ("Strict liability has endured decades
of unremitting academic condemnation. Its use has been widely criticized as both inefficacious and unjust .... ); Wiley, supra note 214, at 1080 ("By definition, we cannot know that
a person deserves the moral lash of criminal conviction if we have no proof of that person's
culpability. Most commentators therefore have concluded that strict criminal liability is
simply a bad idea.").

218. See George P. Fletcher & Jens David Ohlin, Reclaiming FundamentalPrinciples of
CriminalLaw in the Darfur Case, 3 J. IN-r'L CRIM. JusT. 539, 550 (2005) (arguing that strict
liability is inappropriate in international criminal law); Danner & Martinez, supra note 213,
at 139 (noting that the adoption of strict liability in international criminal law would be
"fundamentally out of step with the moral and philosophical underpinnings of contemporary criminal justice.").
219. See Turner, supra note 47, at 564-65 (noting that some defense counsel argue that
superior responsibility introduces a form of strict liability into international criminal law).
But see Fairnessand Politics, supra note 14, at 83 (arguing that data indicates superior responsibility does not function as a form of strict liability at the ICTY).
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committing or about to commit the crimes. 220 But even the use of
superior responsibility has been sharply criticized for allegedly
doing away with the requirement of proving that the accused had
the appropriate mens rea for the crime. 2 2' As a result, moving further in the direction of strict liability would not be desirable, even
if it reduced trial complexity.
3.

Indicting Only Low-Level Perpetrators

Another way to reduce the complexity of international criminal
trials would be to charge only low-level direct perpetrators and
avoid trials of high-level indirect perpetrators. 222 This would
reduce overall complexity by eliminating the most complex trials.
However, international courts, under pressure from the international community, have been going in the opposite direction.

While the ICTY did initially charge a number of low-level direct
perpetrators, 223 it was forced to drop most of those cases and told
to focus on "the most senior leaders." 2 2 4 This focus on senior leaders has been a hallmark of the ICTY's Completion Strategy for the
last decade. 225
Other courts have also focused on senior leaders. For example,
this requirement was written into the statutes of the Special Court
for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Extraordinary Chambers in the

Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). Article 1 of the Statute of the SCSL
limits the jurisdiction of the court to those who bear the "greatest
responsibility" for violations of international criminal law, particu22
larly "leaders" who threatened the peace in Sierra Leone. 6 Similarly, the constitutive document of the ECCC limits its jurisdiction
to "senior leaders" and those "most responsible." 2 2 7 In effect, the
SCSL and ECCC have continued the ICTY's focus on trying senior
220. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 28, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (laying out the elements of superior
responsibility).
221. See Turner, supra note 47, at 564-65.
222. A simpler solution would be to not indict or try people for violations of international criminal law at all. The international community, however, has repeatedly rejected
this possibility. See Complexity and Efficiency, supra note 1, at 63-64.
223. Fairness and Politics, supra note 14, at 72-73.
224. Id.
225. See id.
226. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone U.N.-Sierra Leone art. 1, Jan. 16,
2002.
227. Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers U.N.-Cambodia art. 1,
Aug. 10, 2001 (amended Oct. 27, 2004).
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figures thought to be most responsible for orchestrating the
violence. 228
The International Criminal Court (ICC) has no formal limitation to its personal jurisdiction. The Rome Statute says only that
the court will have jurisdiction over "persons" responsible for the
"most serious" crimes of international concern. 229 In practice,
however, its Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has focused on investigating "those who bear the greatest responsibility," particularly
"leaders of the State or organization" responsible for the alleged
crimes.2 3 0 The indictments evidence this focus on senior leaders. 2 3 1 However, the OTP has recently indicated a change in policy; going forward, it may indict some low and mid-ranking accused
in addition to senior accused.2 32
This Article advocates for charging both those leaders most
responsible for orchestrating acts of violence and some lower and
mid-level perpetrators who have engaged in particularly egregious
crimes within the jurisdiction of the tribunal. First, it is simply not
true that only leaders are responsible for mass atrocities. While
many of the direct perpetrators are somewhat interchangeable,
those in the lower levels of the hierarchy still bear legal and moral
228. See Charles Chernor Jalloh, Prosecuting Those Bearing "Greatest Responsibility": The
Lessons of the Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 863, 868 (2013) (describing the
adoption of the "greatest responsibility" language in the SCSL's constitutive instrument as
continuing a "focus on prosecuting the top leaders and architects of mass atrocities" that
began with the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and had continued with the
ICTY); Sean Morrison, ExtraordinaryLanguage in the Courts of Cambodia:Interpretingthe Limiting Language and Personaljurisdictionof the Cambodian Tibunal, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 583, 589
(2009) (arguing that the limiting language in the ECCC's constitutive document was
designed to narrow the focus of prosecutions).
229. Rome Statute, supra note 220, art. 1.
230. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, PAPER ON SOME POLICy ISSUES BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR 7 (Sept. 2003), http://www.icc-cpi.int/
NR/rdonlyres/1FA7C4C6-DE5F-42B7-8B25-60AA962ED8B6/143594/030905_Policy-Pa
per.pdf.
231. For example, the ICC has indicted several present and former heads of state,
including Omar Bashir of Sudan, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya,
and Laurent Gbagbo of C6te d'Ivoire. ICC - Prosecutions, INT'L CIuM. CT., http://www.icc-

cpi.int/en menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecu
tor/prosecutions/pages/prosecutions.aspx (last visited July 5, 2015).
232. See STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 199, at 6 ("The required evidentiary standards to
prove the criminal responsibility of those bearing the greatest responsibility might result in
the OTP changing its approach due to limitations on investigative possibilities and/or a
lack of cooperation. A strategy of gradually building upwards might then be needed in
which the Office first investigates and prosecutes a limited number of mid- and high-level
perpetrators in order to ultimately have a reasonable prospect of conviction for those most
responsible. The Office will also consider prosecuting lower level perpetrators where their
conduct has been particularly grave and has acquired extensive notoriety.").
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responsibility for their actions. Second, some of the crimes that
have been identified by the ICTY as being the most heinous have
been carried out by mid-level perpetrators.2 3 3
International criminal courts should retain the discretion to
reach further down the organizational chart to prosecute such
individuals. However, if the courts must choose between prosecuting senior leaders and lower level perpetrators, then it makes sense
to focus on senior leaders, as they are the figures most likely to
have the authority to both start and stop atrocities. In essence, if
one expects international criminal law to reduce violations, it is
logical to focus on senior leaders.
It appears very likely that international criminal courts will continue to focus on high-level indirect perpetrators.2 3 4 The ICC may
eventually prosecute some mid-level accused in addition to the
senior accused, but it is not going to give up prosecuting senior
leaders.2 3 5 Thus, we can expect the majority of international trials
to continue to be extremely complex.
4.

Single-Accused vs. Multi-Accused Trials

The ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) have disagreed about whether it is more efficient to consolidate the cases against defendants accused of related criminal acts
into large multi-accused cases, or to try the accused individuallyeven if the charges against them are related. The ICTY chose to
combine its accused together into larger cases, arguing that doing
so was more efficient because it would avoid the presentation of
the same evidence in multiple trials.23 6 The ICTR, meanwhile, has
argued that trying the accused individually is more efficient
because individual trials are much shorter.2 3 7 This dispute has
233.
234.

See Fairness and Politics, supra note 14, at 97.
See supra text accompanying notes 223-32.

235.

See supra text accompanying note 232.

236. See Advisory Comm. on Admin. & Budgetary Questions, Second Performance
Reports for the Biennium 2006-2007 and Proposed Budgets for the Biennium 2008-2009
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and of the International Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. A/62/578 (Dec. 11, 2007) ("[T]he [ICTY] considers that the multiple-accused trials reduce overall trial time substantially in comparison
with holding separate trials for each of the accused."); U.N. Secretary-General, Budget for
the InternationalTribunalfor the Prosecution ofPersons Responsiblefor Serious Violations of International HumanitarianLaw Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991

for the

Biennium 2006-2007, 1 63, U.N. Doc. A/60/264 (Aug. 17, 2005) ("Multiple-accused cases
will undoubtedly be more efficient and make trials faster since the crime base will not be
required to be proven in several separate trials.").
237. See U.N. Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, supra
note 236, ¶ 11 ("By contrast, the Committee was informed that the experience of the
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obvious implications for trial complexity. If it really is more efficient to try accused separately, even if their alleged crimes are
related, doing so at all international tribunals would reduce overall
trial complexity.
To test this question, all twenty of the multi-accused cases at the
ICTY that had a completed first trial were examined. 2 38 These
twenty trials represent a range of complexity, with eleven of them
being less complex than the average ICTY case. On the other
hand, the largest multi-accused cases also represented the most
complex cases that have come before the ICTY, including the cases
of SainoviW et al., Popovie et al., and Pr1i6 et al., which were the three
most complex cases heard by the ICTY.2 3 9

For each of the multi-accused cases, the model was used to estimate the total complexity that would have resulted if each of the
accused had been tried separately. The estimated complexity of
the individual trials was combined and then compared to the
actual Complexity Scores for the multi-accused trials. The results
are presented below in Table 4.
Of the twenty multi-accused trials, the model estimates that only
one of them, Naletilie & MartinoviW, could have been tried with less
complexity if it had been divided into separate trials. For two other
multi-accused trials, their complexity would be an estimated 5 to 10
percent higher if they were tried separately, compared to their
actual complexity as multi-accused trials. 240 For these trials, it
makes relatively little difference whether the accused are tried
together or separately. The remaining seventeen multi-accused trials are estimated to have generated significantly more complexity if
tried separately.2 4 1 The model predicts that trying multi-accused
trials as separate trials would have increased their overall complexity by 90 percent.2 4 2
The effect appears to be the greatest for the most complex cases.
SainoviW et al., Popovie et al., and Prlid et al. had a combined actual
Complexity Score of 6.88. However, if the accused had been tried
separately, the model predicts that the resulting individual trials
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda showed that trials of single-cases was a more
efficient way to proceed, with one-single case trial taking no more than 16 weeks, while
multiple-accused trials could last 300 days or even more.").
238. See Complexity and Efficiency, supra note 1, at app. 68 (listing the ICTY cases sorted
by complexity).
239. See id.
240. See infra Table 4.
241. Id.
242. Id.
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would have had a combined complexity score of 18.83, an increase
of 174 percent. It appears the ICTY correctly chose to consolidate
the accused into large multi-accused trials. The model shows that
the larger the number of accused tried together, the greater the
reduction in overall complexity, even if the trials that result are still
extremely complex. This suggests that where accused are alleged
to have participated in the same or related crimes, multi-accused
trials are the preferred solution.
TABLE 4: SINGLE

Case

VS. MULTI-ACCUSED TRIALS

No. of
Accused

Actual
Comp.
Score
.77

Est. Comp.
of Indiv.
Trials
1.51

Percent
Difference
+96%

.76

1.19

+57%
+5%

Blagojevie &Jokik
Bolkoski & Tartulovski
Hadlihasanovie & Kubura

2

1.32

1.38

Kordi6 & Cerkez
Naletilie & Martinovie

2
2

1.72
.82

1.88

+9%

.70

-15%

Lukic & Lukic

2

.51

.72

+41%

Stanisic & Simatovic
Stanisic & Zupljanin
Kunarac, Kovac, & Vukovic

2
2

1.28
1.84

1.34

+47%

2.39

+30%

3
3
3

.35
.37
.77

.79
1.03
1.50

+126%
+178%
+95%

Limaj et al.
Mrkli et al.
Simi6 et al.

2
2

3

1.00

2.04

+104%

Haradinaj et al.
Gotovina & Marka

3
3

.62
1.60

1.90
2.62

+206%
+64%

Mucie et al.
Kvoka et al.
Kuprelkit et al.
Prli6 et al.

4
5
6

.69
.73
.81

1.53
.89
1.24

+122%
+22%
+53%

6

2.63

7.41

+182%

Sainovi6 et al.
Popovit et al.

6
7

1.79
2.46
22.84

5.78
5.64
43.48

+223%
+129%
+90%

Total

5.

Symbolic vs. Representative Charging

Another possible way to reduce trial complexity would be to
switch from a representative charging regime to a symbolic charging regime. Symbolic charging occurs when the accused is charged
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with a single or small number of crimes arising out of a single or
small number of significant or easily-proven incidents.2 43 Examples of symbolic charging include the case of Thomas Lubanga at
the ICC and that of Saddam Hussein at the Iraqi Special Tribunal.
Mr. Lubanga was only charged with enlisting, conscripting, and
using child soldiers, 244 even though it would have been possible to
charge him with a broader range of crimes. 245 Similarly, Saddam
Hussein was only charged with crimes arising out of a single location-Dujail-despite evidence that he had been involved in many
other crimes.

246

Despite its potential as a way to reduce trial com-

plexity, symbolic charging has been widely criticized for its failure
to accurately capture the scope of the accused's criminality.2 4 7
In contrast to the trials of Lubanga and Hussein, the ICTY has
consistently used a representative charging strategy.2 48 The goal is
not usually to charge the accused with every single crime that they
could be found guilty of, but rather to charge the accused with a
representative sample of the crimes they are allegedly responsible
for.24 9 Another objective is to convey an accurate, representative
picture of the accused's overall criminality. 25 0 This almost always
243. See Complexity and Efficiency, supra note 1, at 64-65.
244. See Prosecutor v. Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the
Statute, I 1 (Mar. 14, 2012) (describing the charges).
245. See Suzan M. Pritchett, Entrenched Hegemony, Efficient Procedure, or Selective Justice?:
An Inquiry into Chargesfor Gender-Based Violence at the InternationalCriminal Court, 17 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 265, 286-91 (2008) (arguing that Lubanga could and should
have been charged with crimes related to murder, torture, and sexual violence).
246. See Robert Cryer, Prosecuting the Leaders: Promises, Politics and Practicalities, I COTTINGENJ. INT'L

L. 45, 72-74 (2009).

247. Complexity and Efficiency, supra note 1, at 65. See, e.g., Mundis, supra note 53, at 693
("Following World War II, would anyone have been satisfied if the Nazi killing machine
were put on trial solely for Auschwitz as a 'representative crime site'? Can anyone today
claim that the trial of Saddam Hussein before the Iraqi Special Tribunal and his execution
solely for the crimes in Dujail held him accountable for the totality of his criminal
record?").
248. See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, IT/32/Rev. 44, Dec. 10, 2009, Rule 73 bis (D) (stating that the scope of the
indictment should be "reasonably representative" of the accused's criminality, taking into
account "all the relevant circumstances" including the classification and nature of the
charges, the location of the alleged crimes, the scale of the crimes, and the victims of the
crimes).
249. Complexity and Efficiency, supra note 1, at 64-65.
250. See Mundis, supra note 53, at 693 ("[P]rosecutors are duty bound to draft indictments that reflect the scale and scope of [the accused's] criminality."); see also International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Rules of Procedure and Evidence, IT/
32/Rev. 44, Dec. 10, 2009, Rule 73 bis (D) (grantingjudges the ability to alter the number
of crime sites and counts about which the prosecutor may present evidence at trial so long
as the resulting trial would be "reasonably representative of the crimes charged").
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involves charging the accused with counts arising out of more than
one incident or crime site.
While reducing the cost and complexity of the trials is not the
only justification for symbolic charging, it is a key justification. For
example, the ICC Prosecutor justified the decision to charge
Lubanga with only a small number of crimes by arguing that
"focused .

.

. prosecutions" would mean "short investigations" and

"expeditious trials" involving "a limited number of incidents and as
few witnesses as possible." 2 5 1 This argument is premised on the
idea that symbolic charging will dramatically reduce the complexity of both the investigations and the trials. The model of trial
complexity in this Article casts doubt on this rationale, as it
predicts that the accused's seniority and whether they are a direct
perpetrator drives the majority of complexity; focusing on a single
crime site will not change the effect of those two factors. 252
To see how much complexity could have been eliminated from
ICTY trials by moving to a symbolic charging regime, the model
was used to estimate the complexity of the ten most complex trials
if those trials had been based on only a single crime site per trial
and a single charge per accused. All other aspects of the trials were
kept the same. The ten most complex trials were chosen because if
symbolic charging has value, its value will presumably be most
apparent when used in cases that would otherwise be very complex.
The results are shown below in Table 5.
TABLE 5: SYMBOLIC VS. REPRESENTATWE CHARGING

Case
Hadlihasanovit & Kubura
Tolimir

Representative
Charging2 53
1.32
1.47

Symbolic
Charging 254

Percent
Difference

.87
1.11

-34%
-24%

251. See THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY 5 (Sept.
14, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D673DD8C-D427-4547-BC69-2D363EO72
74B/143708/ProsecutorialStrategy2006O9l4_- English.pdf; see also INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT, NEWSLETTER # 10, 2 (Nov. 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/2ADO4D
(quoting the ProsD6-6E18-4B9B-9477-4DFCD8D607A4/278462/ICCNL10200611_En.pdf
ecutor as saying "[flocused investigations will limit the length of trials. Shorter trials will
also mean the more efficient use of resources.").
252. See supra Figure 1.
253. This column contains the complexity of the case as it was actually tried at the
ICTY. See Complexity and Efficiency, supra note 1, app. at 68.
254. This column contains the estimated complexity of the case if it had been tried
with only one crime site per trial and one count per accused. The model was used to
estimate the complexity value.
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Krajignik

1.51

1.06

-30%

Gotovina & Marka

1.60

1.13

-29%

BrcTanin

1.63

.93

-43%

Kordit & Cerkez

1.72

1.00

-42%

§ainovi( et al.

1.79

1.90

+6%

Stanigit & Zupljanin

1.84

1.10

-40%

Popovie et al.

2.46

2.14

-13%

Prlit et al.

2.63

1.90

-28%

17.97

13.14

-27%

Total

Adopting a symbolic charging strategy in these cases would have
reduced their trial complexity by, at best, about 27 percent.25 5 This
is a significant reduction, but still results in very complex cases.
But is reducing the complexity of the ICTY's trials by about a quarter a significant enough benefit to justify moving to a symbolic
charging regime?
One way to think about the difference between a representative
charging system and a symbolic charging system involves the purposes of international criminal justice, of which there are many.2 5 6
At least three would be more difficult to achieve via symbolic charging: 1) finding closure for the victims; 2) setting the historical
record; and 3) promoting post-conflict reconciliation. 25 7 There
would be no closure for those victims of incidents other than the
one charged because those other crimes would never be the subject of adjudication. Similarly, the trial would only be useful in setting the record with regard to the incident charged. Any other
incidents would be left unexamined. Finally, having a court collect
evidence of atrocities may be crucial to post-conflict reconcilia255. This is the best case figure for two reasons. First, the calculation is based on the
ten most complex cases. In other words, it is based on the cases where we would expect
symbolic charging to have the greatest impact. This likely exaggerates the effect symbolic
charging would have if used in all of a tribunal's cases. Second, this calculation assumes
that each accused would be charged with just a single count occurring at a single crime
site. In practice, symbolic charging rarely involves just one crime site and just one count.
Thus it is likely that the actual effect of a switch to symbolic charging would be smaller than
Table 5 suggests.
256. See Mirjan Damaska, What is the Point of InternationalCiminalJustice?, 83 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 329, 331 (2008) (describing purposes of international tribunals); Minna
Schrag, Lessons Learned from ICTY Experience, 2J. INT'L CRIM.JusT. 427, 428 (2004) (same);
Turner, supra note 47, at 537-43 (same).
257. See Mundis, supra note 53, at 693 (arguing that these three purposes are served by
representative charging).
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If a court examines only a single incident, its ability to

influence reconciliation will be diminished. A representative
charging system is likely preferable to a symbolic one because it
provides redress for many more victims than a symbolic charging
strategy while establishing a fuller historical record, which in turn
leads to a greater possibility of post-conflict reconciliation.
One can view the symbolic versus representative charging debate
as a trade-off between the complexity of trials and the purposes
they are meant to serve. The complexity of the ICTY's trials could
be reduced by, at best, about one quarter by moving to a symbolic
charging regime.2 5 9 This would come at the cost of significantly
reducing the court's ability to fulfill a number of its purposes. 26 0 In
other words, it would probably have made the ICTY slightly quicker
and cheaper but less effective.26 1
Assuming that the model used at the ICTY has some validity at
the other international tribunals, there might be support for
adopting a symbolic charging strategy from the members of the
ICC's Assembly of States Parties. There has been a great deal of
pressure in recent years from some of the ICC's biggest funders to
keep the court's budget flat or reduce it.262 Adopting a symbolic
charging strategy would offer hope of reducing the complexity and
cost of the ICC's trials.
Still, states should think carefully before pushing for such a strategy at the ICC. Reducing the complexity of individual trials would
allow the court to either try more cases in the same amount of time
and with the same budget, or try the same number of cases for less
money in less time. But the trials are not conducted merely for the
sake of doing so; they are conducted because of their expected
contribution to the goals of international criminal justice. In other
words, cost is not the only variable. Rather, cost and effectiveness
must be viewed together, and decisions that modify how the ICC
operates must be cost-effective rather than just cost-cutting. Given
the risk that symbolic charging would make it dramatically harder
258. See Stuart Ford, A Social Psychology Model of the Perceived Legitimacy of International
Criminal Courts: Implications for the Success of Transitionaljustice Mechanisms, 45 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 405, 472-75 (2012).
259. See supra text accompanying note 255.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 257-58.
261. Effectiveness is measured by how the ICTY's trials contribute to the achievement
of the court's overall purposes. See Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International
Courts: A Goal-Based Approach, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 225, 230 (2012).
262. See generally Stuart Ford, How Much Money Does the ICC Need?, in THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Carsten Stahn ed., 2015).
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for the ICC to achieve some of its aims, moving to a symbolic
charging strategy may not be a wise decision, even if it is less expensive. Indeed, the ICC's Office of the Prosecutor has recently signaled its intent to move away from the "focused investigations and
prosecutions" model that led to the very narrow indictment in the
Lubanga case, as a result of criticism of this approach.2 6 3
6.

Plea Bargaining

Another way to reduce trial complexity is to use plea bargaining.
To the extent that the accused plead guilty in exchange for either
reductions in the final sentence 264 or the dropping of charges, 265
plea bargaining could drastically reduce the complexity of trials by
obviating the need to present evidence to establish the accused's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 6 6 Indeed, after initially opposing plea bargains, the ICTY eventually endorsed their use because
of pressure from the international community to finish its work
quickly.2 6 7 Thus, in theory, greater use of plea bargaining could be
used to reduce overall trial complexity.
There are at least two problems with this approach. The first
problem is that everyone must be able to agree on a plea bargain. 268 If either the prosecutor or the accused is unwilling to
countenance a plea, then plea bargaining is not a possibility. In
such a situation, a full trial is the only way to resolve the impasse.
The second problem is that having a significant number of trials is
263. See STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 199, 1 3 (noting that the judges at the ICC were
not satisfied with the evidence the Office of the Prosecutor produced under its "focused
investigations and prosecutions approach"); Id. 1 23 (noting that "the approach of focused
investigations is therefore replaced with the principle of in-depth, open-ended investigations"). See also supra note 247 (noting that the OTP's symbolic charging strategy has been
widely criticized by scholars).
264. This is known as sentence bargaining. See Michael P. Scharf, TradingJustice for
Efficiency: Plea-Bargainingand International Tribunals, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1070, 1074
(2004).
265. This is known as charge bargaining. Id.
266. Id. at 1076 (noting that "international Tribunals have primarily justified plea-bargaining in terms of conserving scarce judicial resources"). See also Nancy Amoury Combs,
Copping a Plea to Genocide: The Plea Bargainingof InternationalCrimes, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
90-102 (2002) (arguing that plea bargains were adopted at the ICTY to reduce the complexity of the trials).
267. See Scharf, supra note 264, at 1073, 1077-78; Anna Petrig, NegotiatedJustice and the
Goals of International Criminal Tribunals, 8 CHI.-KENT J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 8-9 (2008);
Regina E. Rauxloh, Plea Bargaining in International Criminaljustice: Can the International
Criminal Court Afford to Avoid Trials?, IJ. CRIM. JUST. RES. 1, 10 (2011).
268. See, e.g., International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Rules of Procedure and Evidence, IT/32/Rev. 49, May 22, 2013, Rule 62 bis (requiring that the court
must ensure that a guilty plea "has been made voluntarily" before accepting it).
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probably necessary to achieve the purposes of international criminal tribunals. This limits the extent to which plea bargains can be
used as a substitute for trials.
With respect to the first problem, there are cases where neither
side is willing to accept a plea bargain. For example, it seems
unlikely that either the prosecutors or Slobodan Milogevic would
have been willing to countenance a plea bargain in his case. The
prosecutors saw Mr. Milogevic as the individual most responsible
for the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and consequent
atrocities. 2 6 9 Given the prosecutors' perception of Milogevic as the
key figure in the conflict, it is hard to imagine that they would have
been willing to offer a plea bargain. 2 70 Milogevic, for his part, saw
the trial as a platform from which he could make a political
stand.2 7 1 It is equally hard to imagine that Milogevic would have
agreed to either pleading guilty and accepting responsibility for
what happened in the Balkans, or foregoing the platform that the
trial afforded him.2 7 2

While not all accused are akin to Mr. Milogevic, senior accused
are less likely to enter into plea bargains than more junior
accused.2 7 3 This is true for at least two reasons. First, senior
accused are more likely to be the accused in strategically important
cases and prosecutors are less likely to offer plea bargains in strategically important cases. 274 Second, senior accused are more likely
to see their trial in political terms and thus more likely prefer trials
over plea bargains. 275 This conclusion is supported by the experience at the ICTY where the majority of plea bargains were accepted
by relatively low-level accused.2 7 6 The ICTY did secure plea bar269. See Ford, supra note 258, at 415.
270. Cf Combs, supra note 266, at 104-05 (noting that it "would seem perverse at best"
for an ICTY prosecutor to negotiate a plea bargain that did not accurately reflect the
accused's criminal behavior given the underlying purposes of the tribunal); Petrig, supra
note 267, at 16-21 (arguing that there is a duty to prosecute the most heinous crimes and
that the more serious the charges against the accused, the less appropriate it is to offer a
plea bargain).
271. See Ford, supra note 258, at 41 (noting that Milogevic used the trial to argue that
the West was responsible for the conflict in the Balkans and that he and the Serbs were
victims).
272. See Combs, supranote 266, at 105 (noting that "the typical Tribunal defendant has
committed large-scale atrocities motivated by intense nationalism or ethnic or religious
hatred. Such a defendant is more apt to consider a guilty plea abhorrent, viewing it as
capitulation before an illegitimate international body").
273. See infra text accompanying notes 274-77.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 224-25, 270.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 56, 271-72.
276. Fairness and Politics, supra note 14, at 102 (noting that those who pled guilty at the
ICTY were, on average, younger, less senior, charged with fewer counts, alleged to be
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gains against a very small number of more senior accused, but
these were the exception rather than the rule.2 77
The ICTY's experience suggests that the ability to use plea bargaining to reduce trial complexity has its limits. In all probability,
plea bargaining at international tribunals will be used most frequently against low to mid-level accused and least frequently
against high-level accused. The problem is that trials of high-level
accused tend to be the most complex. Thus, plea bargains will
result in the elimination of the least complex cases. The most complex cases involving senior accused are likely to require trials.
The second reason that the use of plea bargains will be limited
in its ability to reduce trial complexity is that having a significant
number of trials is probably necessary to achieve the purposes of
international criminal tribunals. In theory, plea bargains can help
international tribunals fulfill their purposes. For example, confessions obtained through plea bargains may assist the court's recordsetting function by providing an insider's account of the events at
issue.27 8 A full and frank confession may also contribute to postconflict reconciliation by helping both sides accept responsibility
for crimes committed by members of their own group.27 9 Confessions, particularly where the accused shows true remorse, may also
help victims find closure .280
In practice, however, the guilty pleas at the ICTY have often
failed to live up to their promise. For example, the guilty plea by
Biljana Plavic was initially hailed by prosecutors as "an unprecedented contribution to the establishment of truth and a significant
effort toward the advancement of reconciliation."2 8 1 However, her
guilty plea upset many of her victims because she received a reduction in both the charges and her sentence in return for the confession. 2 8 2 In addition, she refused to inculpate others, which both
reduced her confession's contribution to the court's record-setting
function and called into question her sincerity and remorse. 283
Despite having received the benefit of her confession at sentencresponsible for fewer deaths, and more likely to be charged as direct perpetrators than
those accused who went to trial).
277. Id. at 88, 102.
278. See Combs, supra note 266, at 126; Petrig, supra note 267, at 14.
279. See Ford, supra note 258, at 473-74; Rauxloh, supra note 267, at 6-7.
280. See Ford, supra note 258, at 474.
281. See Prosecutor v. Plavgic, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1-S, Sentencing Judgement, 1 67
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 27, 2003).
282. See Rauxloh, supra, note 267, at 7.
283. See Nancy Amoury Combs, Prosecutor v. Plavfic, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 929, 933-34
(2003).
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ing, she later repudiated her confession and claimed that she was
innocent. 2 84 Hence, while plea bargains can contribute to the
court's purposes, often they do not.2 8 5

'

What is more, plea bargains can undermine the purposes of
international criminal law. For example, dropping crime sites or
charges in return for a guilty plea can make it harder to establish a
historical record, as evidence related to the dropped crime sites or
charges will not become part of the record.28 6 Even if no crime
sites or charges are dropped as part of the plea bargain, the facts
admitted by the accused are usually only a few pages in length and
are much less comprehensive than the factual findings in the average ICTY judgment.28 7 As a result, plea bargains can hinder the
court's record-setting function. Because establishing the historical
record is also one of the most important contributions international tribunals can make to post-conflict reconciliation,2 8 8 plea
bargains may also indirectly reduce the court's ability to foster
reconciliation.
Plea bargaining can also make it more difficult to provide closure for victims. For example, a substantial number of victims may
want to participate in the trial "in order to confront the accused
with their grievance." 28 9 This is all but impossible if the charges
are resolved through a plea bargain. In addition, victim communities often perceive plea bargaining as resulting in excessive leniency or even impunity for perpetrators of violence. 290 This may
prevent them from accepting a plea bargain as a fair resolution of
the matter. The victims' reluctance to accept a plea bargain can be
compounded by the relatively light punishments given for violations of international criminal law relative to the punishments
given in many domestic systems for crimes of the same gravity.2 9
The effect of a reduction in the sentence for a guilty plea on top of
a base sentence that already seems inadequate may make it very
hard for victims to find closure. While there are undoubtedly situa284. See Ford, supra note 258, at 474 n.349.
285. See id. at 473 n.346 (arguing that confessions are often vague about key details and
minimize or deny responsibility for what occurred).
286. See Petrig, supra note 267, at 15-16.
287. See id. at 16.
288. See Ford, supra note 258, at 472.
289. See Petrig, supra note 267, at 22. See also Rauxloh, supra note 267, at 13 (noting
that trials may provide victims with a chance to give their perspective).
290. See Rauxloh, supra note 267, at 14.
291. See Fairness and Politics, supra note 14, at 98-101.
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tions in which offering a plea bargain would be appropriate, 29 2 it is
inappropriate and ineffective to promote guilty pleas as a primary
means of reducing a court's workload. 2 9 3
In conclusion, the cases most likely to result in plea deals are the
least complex, while the most complex cases are likely to go to
trial. Furthermore, the practical experience at the ICTY has been
that the outcome of guilty pleas has often been at odds with the
court's purposes. Fulfillment of those purposes requires that the
majority of cases at international criminal courts proceed to trial.
For these reasons, it is unlikely that plea bargains can be used to
meaningfully reduce a court's workload without undermining the
purposes of international criminal justice.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

In the past ten years, international tribunals have focused their
efforts on the most senior accused, almost none of whom are direct
perpetrators of violence. 29 4 The result has been trials of enormous
complexity, the causes of which are largely out of the control of
judges and prosecutors. The model presented in this Article indicates that the complexity of these trials results from the policy decision to focus on senior leaders, and it cannot be meaningfully
changed by varying the number of crime sites, counts, or modes of
liability. Rather, the enormous complexity of these trials is a result
of the difficulty of attributing responsibility for crimes to accused
who are organizationally and geographically distant from the physical commission of those crimes. This suggests that the length and
cost of international criminal trials is unlikely to be seriously
changed by anything short of a fundamental change in our policy
of indicting and trying senior leaders.
However, it is not clear that international tribunals should
change their policy of indicting and trying senior leaders. After all,
292. See, e.g., Rauxloh, supra note 267, at 21-22 (arguing that plea bargains should be
used only to obtain evidence against senior accused who could not be prosecuted without
that evidence; to secure evidence crucial to the historical record and otherwise unavailable;
and to obtain admissions of guilt essential to fostering post-conflict reconciliation).
293. See id. at 11 ("[I]t is doubtful whether financial reasons alone are sufficient to
legitimize plea bargains."); see also Theresa Marie Clark, Transplantjustice?: The Efficacy of a
Purely Common Law Concept in the International Criminal Law Forum, 9 BUFF. Hum. RTs. L.
REV. 75, 109 (2003) ("Even recognizing the substantial administrative benefits of timely
guilty pleas ... the author nonetheless struggles to justify what is essentially an allowance of
administrative concerns to mitigate the punishment of those convicted of the most heinous
crimes known to humankind!").
294. At the ICTY, direct perpetration and seniority were strongly negatively correlated.
Fairness and Politics, supra note 14, at 67.
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it is those senior leaders that have the greatest power over whether
atrocities happen, and the authority to prevent them. While lowlevel perpetrators bear both moral and legal responsibility for their
acts, they are largely cogs in a machine. Punishing them is unlikely
to prevent the commission of future atrocities because they are easily replaceable. In that sense, focusing on senior leaders may be a
wise policy choice.2 9 5 Ultimately, the cost and complexity of international criminal trials are necessary consequences of that
decision.

295. We could also prosecute those lower down in the hierarchy in addition to senior
leaders, but the international community has no appetite for increasing the size and cost of
international courts in order to prosecute both types of defendants. See, e.g., Fairnessand
Politics, supra note 14, at 71-73 (noting that the Security Council pressured the ICTY to
drop the indictments against the lowest ranking accused to save time and money).

